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INTRODUCTION 
Traditionally, the preclusive effect given a judgment has been 
limited by the doctrine of mutuality of collateral estoppel: A party to 
litigation may not invoke the benefits of a prior judgment to pre-
clude an opponent unless that party would have been bound had the 
prior judgment gone the other way.1 The mutuality doctrine has for 
1. See Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper, Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111, 127 
(1912); Keokuk & Western R.R. v. Missouri, 152 U.S. 301, 317 (1894); REsTATEMENT OF 
JUDGMENTS § 93 (1942); Semmel, Collateral Estoppel, Mutuality and Joinder of Parties, 68 
CoLUM. L. REV. 1457, 1459 (1968). 
The traditional rationale for the doctrine of mutuality is that a lawsuit is "a means of 
settling a dispute between litigants," Hornstein v. Kramer Bros. Freight Lines, 133 F.2d 143, 
145 (3d Cir. 1943) (emphasis added), and that a party, in order to be bound, must have had his 
day in court, 1B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 0.411(1), at 1252 (2d ed. 1974). While one 
against whom a judgment has been entered has certainly had his day in court against the 
adversary in that suit, he has not had the opportunity to be heard in opposition to a stranger to 
that litigation. See id. 10.412(1), at 1811. 
Moore and Currier offer an alternative statement of the mutuality doctrine to the effect 
that "one who invokes the conclusive effect of a judgment must have been either a party or one 
612 
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some years been the subject of sustained and vigorous attack from 
in privity with a party to the suit in which the judgment was rendered." Moore & Currier, 
Mutuality and Conclusiveness of Judgments, 35 TUL. L. REV. 301, 302 (1961). In multi-party 
situations, the mutuality doctrine does have the effect of denying the benefits of collateral 
estoppel to one who was not previously a party or in privity with a party, but this is properly 
attributable to the interaction between the requirements of due process and the mutuality doc-
trine, rather than to mutuality alone. In general, due process prevents a judgment from 
binding one who was not a party to the suit in which it was rendered. See Hansberry v. Lee, 
311 U.S. 32, 44-45 (1940). There is, however, no due process requirement as such that one 
must have been a party in order to invoke the benefits of a prior judgment. This is the prov-
ince of mutuality. See Pennington v. Snow, 471 P.2d 370, 375 (Alaska 1970) (carefully ob-
serving the distinction between who is bound and who is benefited), discussed in text at notes 
158-66 infra-, Polasky, Collateral Estoppel-Effects of Prior Litigation, 39 low AL. REv. 217, 
241-42 (1954). 
Combining the due process requirement (that one must be a party or in privity with a party 
in order to be bound) with the mutuality requirement (that one must be bound in order to raise 
an estoppel) leads readily to the "identity of parties" rule. While the "identity of parties" 
statement of mutuality leads to a proper result in most cases, it is not a precise statement of the 
rule and tends to hinder analysis. Consider the preclusive effect given a criminal judgment in 
a related civil action, Moore & Currier, supra at 302 n.1. An acquittal in a criminal trial does 
not bar the state in a later civil suit because of the extraordinary burden of persuasion required 
for a criminal conviction. United States v. National Assn. of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485, 
492-94 (1950). Yet, for much the same reason, a conviction may be conclusive against the 
defendant in the subsequent civil suit brought by the government. Local 167, International 
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 291 U.S. 293, 298 (1934). Under these circumstances, 
Moore and Currier note, the "identity of parties" test is met but the requirement of true mutu-
ality is not, since the state can invoke the benefits of the criminal conviction in subsequent civil 
litigation although it would not have been bound had the judgment gone the other way. 
Writers on the subject tend to be insensitive to the distinction between the "identity of 
parties" test and the ''would have been bound" requirement of mutuality: Moore and Currier, 
for example, state that "(t]he doctrine of privity qualifies both the requirement of identity of 
parties bound and the requirement of mutuality." Moore & Currier, supra at 330. While the 
doctrine ofprivity may make the requirement of identity of parties (or more precisely the due 
process requirement that a court obtain personal jurisdiction over those whose rights are to be 
adjudicated) easier to meet, it in no sense affects the mutuality doctrine-a privy meets the 
mutuality requirement simply because he is, or would have been, bound by the prior judg-
ment. 
Another writer has claimed that a case involving in rem jurisdiction constitutes an excep-
tion to mutuality since judgments in rem "are binding and conclusive, not only upon the par-
ties actually litigating in the cause, but upon all others." von Moschzisker, Res Judicata, 38 
YALE L.J. 299, 304 n.15 (1929) (citing 1 S. GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE § 525 (10th ed. 1894)). 
Obviously, in rem jurisdiction is not subject to the limitations ofin personamjurisdiction, but 
it creates no exception to the doctrine of mutuality. If a litigant may plead a judgment in rem 
to which he was not a party, it is only because he too would have been similarly bound had it 
gone the other way. 
A few examples illustrating the doctrine of mutuality may prove helpful: 
A woman is injured in a car accident and successfully establishes the negligence of the 
driver. Her husband cannot avail himself of the favorable judgment in a subsequent suit for 
loss of consortium. Neither a party nor a privy to the prior action, he could not have been 
bound by an adverse judgment. Gilman v. Gilman, 115 Vt. 49, 51 A.2d 46 (1947). But see 
Pennington v. Snow, 471 P.2d 370 (Alaska 1970), discussed in text at notes 158-66 infra. 
Thirty manufacturers employ an identical process to manufacture semiconductors. The 
holder of the patent on the process brings suit against one of them, but the patent is held 
invalid. If the mutuality requirement is observed, he will not be precluded from relitigating 
the validity of the patent in a subsequent suit against other producers. Triplett v. Lowell, 297 
U.S. 638 (1936), overruled in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foun-
dation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971) (rejecting mutuality on similar facts in order to preclude the paten-
tee from relitigating). 
An adverse possessor successfully sues to quiet title to the land he holds. A trespasser can 
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both courts2 and commentators.3 The leading case advocating 
abandonment of mutuality is Bernhard v. Bank of America National 
Savings & Trust Association4 (so much so that the abandonment of 
the mutuality requirement is often referred to as the Bernhard doc-
trin:e ). 5 Though-the case might easily have been brought within one 
of the established exceptions to the mutuality doctrine,6 Justice Tray-
plead the in rem judgment in a suit brought by the former landowner although he was not a 
party to the quiet title action because he too is bound. He is liable to the new owner. Cf. 
Gelston v. Hoyt, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 246 (1818) (forfeiture of ship to customs agent precluded 
by prior acquittal even though customs agent was not a party to the prior suit). 
2. See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 
U.S. 313 (1971); Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944,954 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934 
(1964); United States v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. Wash., D. Nev. 1962), 
qffd as to res judicata and mutuality sub nom. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 
(9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 319 U.S. 951 (1964); Bernhard v. Bank of America Natl. Trust & 
Sav. Assn., 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942); Coca Cola Co. v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 36 Del. 124, 
172 A. 260 (Super. Ct. 1934); Schwartz v. Public Admr., 24 N.Y.2d 65, 146 N.E.2d 725, 298 
N.Y.S.2d 955 (1969). 
3. See, e.g., Cox, Res Adjudicata: Who Entitled to Plead, 9 VA. L. REG. (n.s.) 241, 245-47 
(1923); Currie, Civil Procedure: The Tempest Brews, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 25 (1965) (comprehen-
sive state-by-state review in appendix); Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel· Limits of the 
Bernhard JJoctrine, 9 STAN. L. REv. 281 (1957); Polasky, supra note I; Semmel, supra note l; 
35 YALE L.J. 607, 610 (1926). 
4. 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942). In Bernhard, Clara Sather authorized Charles 
Cook to issue drafts against her Los Angeles bank account. Cook opened an account on her 
behalf with the Bank of America in San Dimas. Upon Clara's death, Cook was appointed 
executor of her estate and failed to account for the San Dimas monies. The beneficiaries, 
including Helen Bernhard, filed objections, but the probate court held that Clara had made a 
gift of the funds to Cook. 
Following Cook's discharge as executor, Helen Bernhard was appointed administratrix. 
Claiming that Clara had never consented to the withdrawal of the San Dimas monies, she 
proceeded, in her new capacity, to sue the bank on the theory that it remained indebted to the 
estate. 19 Cal. 2d at 809-10, 122 P.2d at 893-94. 
On appeal from a judgment favorable to the bank, the California Supreme Court, in an 
opinion written by Justice Traynor, held that the matter was res judicata. 19 Cal. 2d at 812-
14, 122 P.2d at 895-96. Bernhard, having litigated and lost the gift question in the probate 
court, was estopped to relitigate against the bank even though the bank had not been a party to 
the probate proceedings and would not have been bound had the judgment of the probate 
court gone the other way. 
5. See, e.g., United States v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 709, 726 (E.D. Wash., D. 
Nev. 1962), ajfd as to res judicata and mutuality sub nom. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335 
F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 951 (1964). 
6. Had Bernhard been successful in her suit against the bank, it has usually been assumed 
that the bank would have had an indemnity claim against Cook and that the case could there-
fore have been decided under the long-established indemnity exception to mutuality. See text 
at notes 125-51 infra. Indeed, Bernhard was so explained by a lower court in California. In 
re Miller's Estate, 104 Cal. App. 2d 16-17, 230 P.2d 667, 677-78 (1951). 
One commentator, however, has noted that the bank's claim against Cook would more 
likely have been for unjust enrichment or as subrogee to the rights of the estate. Greenebaum, 
In JJejense of the JJoctrine of Mutuality of Estoppel, 45 IND. L.J. 1, 5 (1969). The difference is 
inconsequential, however, because the "indemnity" exception to mutuality, though commonly 
arising in indemnity cases, is invoked to prevent any single party from suffering inconsistent 
liability. If Bernhard had not been precluded, then either the bank would have been left 
without recourse to Cook, or Cook would have been denied the benefits of his previous suc-
cessful defense. See text at notes 130-33 infra. 
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nor, writing for the California Supreme Court, seized upon Bernhard 
to "extirpate the mutuality requirement and put it to the t9rch."7 In 
place of mutuality, he substituted three criteria to be satisfied before 
a plea of res judicata precludes relitigation of an issue: 
Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication identical with the one 
presented in the action in question? Was there a final judgment on the 
merits? Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a party or in 
privily with a party to the prior adjudication?8 
When a doctrine of long standing is overturned, courts attempt 
either to explain the judicial error to which the old rule can be attrib-
uted or to identify those changes in circumstance that have rendered 
it obsolete. This rigorous continuity of thought protects against ju-
dicial excess and shortsightedness. Indeed, if the courts cannot ar-
ticulate the basis for the departure from precedent, there is little 
reason to believe that the new rule is any sounder than the old. 
In the case of mutuality, the analysis has been weak at best. Jus-
tice Traynor in Bernhard cursorily dismissed the mutuality doctrine.9 
The cases since Bernhard have done little better, generally being sat-
isfied to cite Bernhard or other more recent cases adopting Bernhard 
that, like it, actually fall within the traditional exceptions to the mu-
tuality requirement. 10 Certainly the courts have been moved to 
7. Currie, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 25, supra note 3, at 26. The commentators agree that Tray-
nor intended to abandon mutuality entirely rather than to rest the decision on narrower 
grounds. See Currie, 9 STAN. L. REv. 281, supra note 3, at 290 n.22; Greenebaum, supra note 
6, at 5; Moore & Currier, supra note I, at 319; accord, Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. 
University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 324 (1971). 
8. 19 Cal. 2d at 813, 122 P.2d at 895 (emphasis added). 
9. There is no compelling reason ... for requiring that the party asserting the plea of 
res judicata must have been a party, or in privity with a party, to the earlier litigation. 
No satisfactory rationalization has been advanced for the requirement of mutuality. 
Just why a party who was not bound by a previous action should be precluded from 
asserting it as res judicata against a party who was bound by it is difficult to comprehend. 
19 Cal. 2d at 812, 122 P.2d at 894-95. 
Semmel cites this passage with approval, Semmel, supra note I, at 1464, as does Currie, 9 
STAN. L. REv. 281, supra note 3, at 283. Their sentiments are echoed by Polasky's plaintive 
question: 
Accepting the proposition that successive suits involving the same "ultimate issue" should 
not lead to differing results and that there should be an end to litigation of an issue, what 
reason other than a sterile prating of the requirement of mutuality, prevents the operation 
of collateral estoppel as so limited [by the requirement that it not be employed against one 
not previously a party]? 
Polasky, supra note I, at 246. Judge Friendly noted in Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944 
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964), that Bentham had attacked the doctrine "as desti-
tute of any semblance of reason" a century earlier. 327 F.2d at 954, quoted with approval in 
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 323 
(1971). 
10. Greenebaum, supra note 6, at 9. See, e.g., Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944, 954-
S6, (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964); Davis v. McKinnon & Mooney, 266 F.2d 870, 
873 (6th Cir. 19S9); Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419, 422 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 
340 U.S. 865 (1950); United States v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 709, 725-29, (E.D. 
Wash., D. Nev. 1962), qffd as to res judicala and mutuality sub nom. United Air Lines, Inc. v. 
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abandon mutuality at least partly by the embarrassment of obviously 
inconsistent :findings made possible by more than one trial of the 
same issue.11 But the primary motivation has been a concern for 
judicial economy offset by no perceived reason for maintaining mu-
tuality. 12 In the absence of any apparent justification for mutuality, 
critics have attributed the requirement to vague notions of equality 
and justice, 13 an overzealous devotion to formal symmetry rather 
than to substantialjustice,14 and, as Jeremy Bentham suggested, the 
importation to the bench of notions appropriate only to the "gaming-
table." 15 At best, the critics concede that the mutuality doctrine 
Wiener, 335 F.2d 379, 404 (9th Cir. 1964); Tietelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co., 58 Cal. 
2d 601, 604, 375 P.2d 439, 440 (1962); B.R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 144-47, 225 
N.E.2d 195, 197-98 (1967). 
11. "[l]nconsistent results . . . are always a blemish on a judicial system . • . . [I]t is diffi-
cult to tolerate a condition where, on relatively the same set of facts, one fact-finder, be it a 
court or jury, may hold the driver liable, while the other exonerates him." Schwartz v. Public 
Admr., 24 N.Y.2d 65, 74, 246 N.E.2d 725, 730-31, 298 N.Y.S. 2d 955, 962 (1969), quoted in 
Greenebaum, supra note 6, at 12. Greenebaum responds that while "[i]nconsistent results 
may be embarrassing to a degree, . . . it is much more disastrous to pretend to an infallibility 
which does not exist .... " Id. at 14. Additionally, he notes that even when mutuality is 
abandoned so that future judgments against the party facing multiple opponents can be forced 
into conformity, "if the common party [has] been fortunate enough to prevail on the critical 
issue in the prior judgment, the law permits him to be subjected to inconsistent results." Id. at 
12. 
12. Part of the motivation for the abandonment of mutuality may come from the fact that 
common parties are more often than not large corporations. It serves, therefore, as sub rosa 
strict liability. There are certainly good arguments to be made for holding a railroad or air-
line strictly liable for injuries to passengers. But a strict liability theory applied so haphaz-
ardly has little to commend it. That an accident involves multiple claimants is hardly a sound 
reason for shifting from a negligence theory to a strict liability theory, and to do so only in 
part, by reducing the common party's chances of success rather than holding him strictly liable 
outright, is just as arbitrary. 
13. See Currie, 9 STAN. L. REv. 281, supra note 3, at 284. To Professor Currie, the rule is 
"curious," a "classic non sequitur," with some inexplicable appeal to the legal mind. Currie, 
53 CALIF. L. REv. 25, supra note 3, at 26. 
14. The finding of no negligence on the other hand was made after full opportunity to 
[plaintiff], on his own election to prove the very matter which he now urges a second time. 
Thus, no unfairness results here from estoppel which is not mutual. In reality the argu-
ment of [plaintiff] is merely that the application of res judicata in this case makes the law 
asymmetrical. But the achievement of substantial justice rather than symmetry is the 
measure of the fairness of the rules of res judicata. 
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 325 
(1971) (quoting from Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419,421 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 
U.S. 865 (1950)). 
15. Another curious rule is, that, as a judgment is not evidence against a stranger, the 
contrary judgment shall not be evidence for him. If the rule itself is a curious one, the 
reason given for it is still more so:-"Nobody can take benefit by a verdict, who had not 
been prejudiced by it, had it gone contrary:" a maxim which one would suppose to have 
found its way from the gaming-table to the bench. If a party be benefited by one throw 
of the dice, he will, if the rules of fair play are observed, be prejudiced by another: but 
that the consequence should hold when applied to justice, is not equally clear. This rule 
of mutuality is destitute of even that semblence of reason, which there is for the rule 
concerning res inter alias acta. There is reason for saying that a man shall not lose his 
cause in consequence of the verdict given in a former proceeding to which he was not a 
party; but there is no reason whatever for saying that he shall not lose his cause in conse-
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may, on occasion, achieve some desirable results, almost as if by ac-
cident.16 Ultimately, the arguments against the mutuality doctrine 
amount to little more than a single rhetorical question: Why, other 
than the "sterile prating of the requirement of mutuality," 17 should a 
1 
p~rty who has had a "full and fair opportunity to litigate"18 be per-
mitted to reopen a question once decided merely because he has 
found, or been found by, a new adversary? 19 
If the mutuality critics are correct that there is no fundamental 
policy embodied in the mutuality requirement, the resources con-
served by avoiding repetitious litigation provide ample justification 
for its abandonment. But, the mutuality requirement has had de-
fenders.20 In general, they have deplored the fetish for economy 
quence of the verdict in a proceeding to which he was a party, merely because his adver-
sary was not. It is right enough that a verdict obtained by A against B should not bar the 
claim of a third party C; but that it should not be evidence in favour of C against B, seems 
the very height of absurdity. 
3 J. BENTHAM, Rationale of Judicial Evidence 579 (1827), reprinted in 7 WORKS OF JEREMY 
BENTHAM 171 (J. Bowring ed. 1843). This passage from Bentham is cited with approval in 
several of the major cases on the question. See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. 
University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1971); Bernhard v. Bank of America 
Natl. Trust & Sav. Assn., 19 Cal 2d. 807, 812, 122 P.2d 892, 895 (1942). It is equally admired 
by the co=entators. See, e.g., Currie, 9 STAN. L. REv. 281, supra note 3, at 284 n.5; Se=el, 
supra note l, at 1461 n.19. 
Greenebaum, however, in his defense of mutuality, asserts that reliance on Benth;µn is 
misplaced. Greenebaum argues, on the basis oflater passages in the same work, that Bentham 
supported the mutuality doctrine in the context of collateral estoppel but thought there was no 
justification for denying the admission of the judgment as evidence. Greenebaum, supra note 
6, at 9 n.35. Of course, in an important sense, it no longer matters what Bentham in-
tended-we are not bound to interpret his works as we would a statute. His argument as 
currently understood (or misunderstood) is deemed persuasive and must therefore be met on 
those terms, not avoided in the belief that Bentham himself intended something else. 
16. There was no virtue in the requirement as such. It was a vague, unanalyzed gener-
alization, conceived, no doubt, in response to felt injustices or anomalies in certain situa-
tions, but conceived with a sprawling generality unjustified by those situations. In 
operation it produced, almost fortuitously, some results which were sound for quite differ-
ent reasons. When we cast out the requirement, we must take care not to overturn those 
sound results, but to seek out and preserve the sound reasons for them . . . . The fate of 
the mutuality rule as applied to collateral estoppel is the same as its fate in other fields of 
law: as a principle of justice it has been shown to be a tinkling cymbal, an empty and 
fatuous formula productive of more harm than good. But in operation it encompassed 
some sound results. Identification of those results and the sound reasons for them is the 
task of more discriminating legal analysis. 
Currie, 9 STAN. L. REv. 281, supra note 3, at 322. 
17. Polasky, supra note 1, at 246. 
18. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 88 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1975). See RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS§ 68.1 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973). 
19. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS§ 88 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1975); REsTATE-
MEN'.r (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68.1 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973). 
20. See, e.g., 1B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ~ 0.412[1] (2d ed. 1974); Greenebaum, 
supra note 6; Moore & Currier, supra note I; von Moschzisker, supra note 1. 
Ironically, some of the most eloquent and persuasive arguments on behalf of mutuality are 
found in Currie, 9 STAN. L. REv. 281, supra note 3. Although Professor Currie professed to 
"have come, like the California Supreme Court, to bury the requirement, not to praise it," id. 
at 322, he sought to distinguish a few exceptional cases in which the doctrine had "inadver-
tently" achieved some desirable results. See the passage quoted in note 16 supra. He ulti-
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that exalts conservation of judicial resources over the judicial sys-
tem's very ends.21 But the Bernhard doctrine continues to gain ad-
herents, .partly, perhaps, because the defenders of mutuality have 
been unable to articulate clearly its central theme. It is the thesis of 
this Note that the function of the mutuality requirement is the fair 
allocation of litigation risks. Although other commentators have 
recognized that the abandonment of mutuality alters litigation risks, 
they have not attached enough weight to this fact to conclude that it 
warrants the retention of mutuality. Section 88 of the Second Re-
statement of Judgments, for example, treats the results dictated by 
the Bernhard doctrine as presumptively correct, to be rejected if re-
quired by the consideration of a number of factors, only one of 
which is the distribution of litigation risks.22 This Note concludes 
that mutuality is qualitatively different from the other Restatement 
factors. Mutuality is the equitable norm for the distribution of liti-
gation risks. The other factors in section 88, far from justifying de-
partures from mutuality when they are weak or bolstering the claims 
of mutuality when they are strong, are considerations that should 
lead us to deny preclusive effect even where mutuality is satisfied. 
But mutuality remains the sine qua non of an equitable result. In 
short, the Bernhard doctrine, in the interest of judicial economy, 
clearly retreats from a commitment to substantive justice. 
Perhaps more significantly (at least to the judicial economists), 
the dollars saved by the Bernhard doctrine are purchased at the price 
of a real although previously unnoted degradation of the other prod-
uct of judicial enterprise-deterrence. If the sanctions which the law 
imposes are to effectuate the substantive policies which justify their 
invocation, the imposition of the sanction must be seen to follow 
from the prohibited conduct. If sanctions are seen as randomly im-
posed they lose all deterrent effect. The Bernhard doctrine weakens 
this crucial link between the theory of liability and the sanction by 
mately rejected his own initial reservations about the abandonment of mutuality, see text at 
notes 55-63 infra, in a later article, Currie, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 25, supra note 3, without ever 
having realized that one of his initial "narrow'' exceptions to the abrogation of the mutuality 
doctrine-the multiple claimant anomaly-subsumed all of the cases in which the mutuality 
problem arises. See text at notes 95-103 infra. 
21. Admittedly, ... the unadorned public interest ... will be immediately served to 
the extent that adjudicated issues will not be subject to relitigation. . . . But the doctrine 
of judicial finality is not a catch-penny contrivance to dispose of cases merely for the sake 
of disposition . . . . The real issue is whether the method of minimization is a proper one. 
Moore & Currier, supra note I, at 308. 
For a discussion of the other arguments against the abandonment of the mutuality doc-
trine, see Appendix A infra. 
22. REsTATEMENT (SECOND} OF JUDGMENTS§ 88 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1976). See note 120 
infra. 
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interjecting an irrelevant and capricious criterion for decision-the 
number of litigants on a given side of a question. 
Using ·probability theory as an aid to analysis, this Note will 
demonstrate that the mutuality doctrine is designed to allocate trial 
risks in a manner consistent with the burden of persuasion in civil 
litigation. Thus, the abandonment of mutuality strikes at the heart 
of the trial process. Where a single party (hereinafter the "common 
party")23 faces multiple opponents on a common question, the aban-
donment of mutuality can significantly alter the common party's 
probability of success. Bernhard thus amounts to little more than an 
instruction to the trier of fact to find against the common party sim-
ply because he is the common party, a fact entirely unrelated to the 
merits of the case. · -.--
Part I of this Note lays the foundation for the conclusions sug-
gested above by setting forth some elementary probabilistic notions 
and establishing a measure of trial efficacy. The next part reviews 
some of the early suggested limitations on the application of 
Bernhard and, by analyzing the mutuality requirement and the 
Bernhard doctrine in probabilistic terms, demonstrates that the con-
cerns underlying those initial reservations were not only sound, but 
require rejection of Bernhard. 
Although the primary purpose of this Note is to expose the 
flawed analysis underlying Bernhard, a secondary . purpose is to 
demonstrate how probability theory can be applied to situations in 
which the mutuality issue arises. Thus, substantial attention is given 
in Part III to the application of probability theory to one of the clas-
sic exceptions to the mutuality requirement that has been cited as 
precedent for the Bernhard doctrine. This analysis establishes that 
mutuality is entirely consistent with its traditional exceptions and 
that these exceptions can be viewed as precedent for Bernhard only 
when analyzed with the same misplaced emphasis on outcome, 
rather than risk allocation, that initially led to the Bernhard doctrine. 
Finally, an examination of a recent decision purporting to adopt 
Bernhard illustrates how analysis without explicit attention to risk 
allocation persistently generates inappropriate rules of preclusion in 
multiple litigation. 
23. This follows terminology suggested by Greenebaum, supra note 6. 
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J. ELEMENTARY PROBABILITY THEORY AND A MEASURE OF 
TRIAL EFFICACY 
A. Probability Theory and the Burden of Persuasion in Civil 
Litigation 
This section will introduce some elementary notions of 
probability theory that relate to fact determination in civil litigation. 
These notions, together with a measure of trial efficacy that will be 
derived from them, will subsequently provide a basis upon which to 
evaluate the effects of the mutuality requirement and of the 
Bernhard doctrine on trial risks and the burden of persuasion in civil 
litigation. 
Probability theory provides a method by which uncertainty can 
be quantified. It is thereby possible to devise a rational strategy for 
minimizing total costs over the long term that takes into account the 
absence of complete knowledge.24 Additionally, the quantification 
of uncertainty makes it possible to manipulate information algebrai-
cally and to extract relationships which are not readily apparent but 
which are nevertheless implicit in that information.25 
The only assumption that must be made in order to establish the 
utility of probability theory is that past experience is the best avail-
able predictor of future experience.26 Suppose, for example, that B 
represents the class of cases in which the lord of the manor was slain 
and the identity of the murderer is known. The subclass of those 
cases in which the butler was determined with absolute certainty to 
have done it is represented by A. If there are m cases in class B and 
n cases in class A, then the ratio of n/m represents the probability 
that a case will be in A given the knowledge that the case is in B, 
abbreviated P(AIB). Since n cannot exceed m, the ratio, expressed 
in decimal terms, will always be a number between O and 1. In the 
hypothetical, P(AIB) represents the probability that the slayer of the 
lord would be determined to be the butler.27 
24. For a leading work on decision analysis, see H. RAIFFA, DECISION ANALY-
SIS-INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON CHOICES UNDER UNCERTAINTY (1970). 
25. See generally Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 
HARV. L. REV. 1329 (1971). 
26. This is a form of what statisticians call "statistical inference." See generally E. KANE, 
EcONOMIC STATISTICS AND ECONOMETRICS 98-108 (1968). 
27. The hypothetical is extremely simple. It assumes the absence of a trend over time and 
of feedback; that is, it ignores the possibility that butlers, knowing that they are prime suspects, 
will be less likely to murder masters. That would be additional evidence for the trier of fact 
that would modify the probability. The hypothetical, however, assumes that literally only one 
relevant fact is known: in n of the m murders previously committed, the butler did it. 
The hypothetical also assumes an "extra-judicial" mode of determination that would make 
it possible to identify with certainty the culprit in prior master murder cases. In real life, of 
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Now, assuming that past experience is the best available predic-
tor of future experience in such cases, a decision-making strategy can 
be developed based on P(AIB). When confronted with another class 
of lord-of-the-manor slayings, Bi, about which membership in Ai, 
the subclass of cases where the butler did it, is unknown, the best 
guess about the number of cases in which the butler would be deter-
mined to have committed the crime is the number ( or the nearest 
whole number thereto) that bears the same ratio to the total number 
of elements of B 1 as n does to m, the total number of elements of B. 
It is the best guess because that relationship between the incidence of 
membership in B and the incidence of membership in A has always 
been the case in the past. In reality the ratio will often not be the 
same. Based on past experience, however, it is the best guess. 
If the object when deciding new lord-of-the-manor cases is to 
minimize the total number of errors,28 and all that is known are 
P(AIB) and the fact that the lord was slain, then applying past expe-
rience and the best-guess rule to a murder about which membership 
in A is unknown, we should guess that the new case is in A, and thus 
that the butler did it, when the probability of A given B exceeds .5. 
When the probability of A is less than .5, the best guess is that the 
butler did not do it. When P(AIB) = .5, then the fact that the case is 
in class B does not tell us anything about whether it is also in class A, 
and there is no best guess. 
Under some circumstances, after a guess has been made, the ac-
tual outcome of a previously uncertain event will become known. 
This process, in tum, adds to our experience and may alter the 
probability with respect to some as yet undetermined matter. How-
ever, the fact that a given matter is susceptible to determination 
while another is not has no bearing on the optimal guessing strategy 
while the matter remains uncertain. The best guess is still that 
which brings to bear our past experience. 
This discussion of rational decision-making is not meant to sug-
gest that determining the best guess is not extremely difficult and 
complex. Unlike those used in the lord-of-the-manor hypothetical, 
most probabilities cannot be determined merely by counting known 
outcomes of past events, because, for example, membership in B is 
itself uncertain or is only one of a myriad of facts that are known. 
course, this function is played by the prior experience of the trier of fact with evidence of the 
kind introduced at trial. The definition of an impartial trier of fact requires that the juror not 
have had the sort of direct experience with the factual matters at issue that is the source of 
expectations about the correlation between events and evidence of those events. 
28. Of course, the goal of rational decision-making may not always be solely to minimize 
the total number of errors. See text at note 29 i,!fra. 
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Rather, a single value for the probability is often no more than a 
subjective estimate. The principle behind the best-guess rule re-
mains the same, however, and for purposes of later analysis, it is the 
principle that is important. No matter how flawed the analysis of the 
probabilities may be, if the goal is to minimize the number of errors 
( or the likelihood of error), clearly the most rational course in a sin-
gle case is to pick the outcome deemed most likely to be correct. 
The problem of decision making is complicated, however, by the 
fact that we are not always attempting to minimize the total number 
of errors. An alternative strategy for rational decision making is re-
quired where, for example, the decision maker considers a verdict 
for one party more undesirable than a verdict for the other party. 
The analysis in such cases is facilitated by "weighting" all possible 
outcomes according to their respective costs.29 Consider, for exam-
ple, the burden of persuasion in criminal cases. An erroneous con-
viction in such cases is deemed more undesirable than an erroneous 
acquittal. Because we want to minimize the cost of decisions, that is 
to minimize the "expected average disutility," and not merely to re-
duce the number of errors, the criminal burden of persuasion does 
not reflect an error-minimizing strategy.30 
In contrast, the burden of persuasion in civil litigation embodies 
a strategy designed to minimize the number of erroneous verdicts. 
This is entirely consistent with the criminal burden of persuasion. 
Whether the relief sought is compensatory or equitable, civil litiga-
tion is essentially a matter ofloss shifting. A loss has been or will be 
incurred; the question is simply who should bear it. Absent some 
peculiar and cognizable virtue inhering in one of the parties, there is 
no reason to prefer an error in one direction over an error in the 
other. Consequently, the preponderance-of-the-evidence test in-
structs the factfinder to follow the error-minimizing strategy to 
choose the verdict most likely to be the truth.31 When there is no 
29. See generally Kaplan, .Decision Theory and the Facrfinding Process, 20 STAN, L. Rev. 
1065, 1073-77 (1968); Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 15 MICH, L. REV. 1021, 1034-41 (1977). 
30. See generally Ball, The Momeni of Truth: Probability Theory and Standards of Proof, 
14 VAND. L. REv. 807 (1961); McBaine, Burden of Proo.ft .Degrees of Belief, 32 CALIF. L. REV. 
242 (1944); Simon & Mahan, (}uant!fying Burdens of Proof, 5 LAW & SocY. Rev. 319 (1971); 
Winter, The Jury and the Risk of Nonpersuasion, 5 LAW & SocY. REV. 335 (1971). 
31. The correctness of this conclusion can be demonstrated with the aid of the "disutility 
matrix" illustrated below. (While customarily called a ''utility matrix" in decision theory, the 
term "disutility'' is used here since some disutility is associated with the nonzero cells. It is 
also often referred to as a "regret" matrix. See Lempert, supra note 29, at 1032 & n.36.) 
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best guess, i.e., when the probability of a verdict in either direction is 
.5, we have a per se rule that the verdict is to be rendered on behalf 
of the defendant. 32 The burden of persuasion is thus not merely a 




ACTUAL STATE OF AFFAIRS 
Plaintiff should Defendant should 
prevail prevail 
du d12 
The entries represent the disutility associated with each verdict given the possible actual 
state of affairs. To calculate the "expected average disutility" associated with a particular 
decision, we define p1 as the probability that the actual state of affairs dictates a verdict for 
plaintiff and p2 as the probability that a verdict for defendant is required. Then e1 and ei, the 
expected average disutility of a verdict for plaintiff and of a verdict for defendant, respectively, 
can be defined by the following equations: 
e1 = d11P1 + d12P2 
ez = d21P1 + d22P2 
If it is assumed that no disutility is associated with a correct verdict and that the two possi-
ble erroneous verdicts are equally undesirable, then d11 = d22 = 0 and d 12 = d21 = I. (The 
value I is chosen for the disutility of an erroneous verdict for ease of calculation and without 
loss of generality since the relative value of disutility, not the absolute value, is all that is 
important.) The disutility matrix under this assumption is: 
C ~ 
Evaluating the expected average disutility for this matrix yields 
e1 = Op1 + I P2 = P2 
e2 = lp1 + Op2 = Pt 
The expected average disutility is minimized by choosing the verdict with the lowest ex-
pected average disutility. Since the only possibilities for the actual state of affairs are that 
plaintiff should prevail (p1) or that defendant should prevail (Pi), PI+ p2 = I. Consequently, 
e1 will be less than Ci, dictating a verdict for plaintiff, only when p1 is greater than p2, i.e., 
when PI is greater than .5. The result is intuitively obvious. When the cost of an error in one 
direction is equal to the cost of an error in the other direction and a correct decision is costless, 
the strategy for minimizine total cost is to pick the outcome most likely to be correct, that is, to 
mini mire the total number of errors. This is reflected in civil litigation by the requirement of a 
verdict for plaintiff when he has met the burden of persuasion, or in other words, when he has 
convinced the trier of fact that it is more likely than not that he is correct. See McBaine; 
Simon & Mahan; Winter, supra note 30. 
At the same time, a strategy designed to minimize the total number of errors reveals some-
thing about the values of d: the expected average disutilities are equal when the probability 
that either party should prevail is .5. If nothing else were known about the values of d, this 
strategy would reveal that d11 + dI2 = d21 + d22• Ifit is assumed that there is no disutility 
associated with a correct verdict so that d 1 I = d22 = O, then the strategy implies that an errone-
ous verdict on behalf of one party is no more or less desirable than an erroneous judgment on 
behalf of the other, i.e., that d12 = d22• 
For an application of the disutility matrix to a criminal trial, where dI2 ,j, d21, see Lempert, 
supra note 29, at 1038. The so-called error minimizing strategy is merely a special case of the 
more general program of minimizing costs in which the point of decision is a probability of .5. 
32. It is important not to overestimate the strength of the claim that civil litigation func-
tiom Mth, D-G :) 
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the fundamental assumption of civil litigation that, without regard to 
the merits, neither party is the more deserving of a favorable judg-
ment. 
The error minimizing strategy illustrates the utility of probability 
theory in relating knowledge about the true state of affairs and costs 
in a manner that permits rational decision-making in civil litigation 
in the face of uncertainty. Probability theory is also useful in relat-
ing various pieces of information whose relationship is not readily 
apparent. This is accomplished with the aid of the calculus of 
probabilities, a set of rules that describes how unknown probabilities 
can be calculated from known probabilities. The most useful of 
these rules for present purposes are the rule for calculating com-
pound probabilities for independent events and Bayes' Theorem. 
Events are independent if the outcome of one trial does not affect 
the probability of a given outcome in a succeeding trial. The classic 
example is dice-throwing, where the outcome of one roll does not 
affect the outcome of succeeding rolls. The rule for calculating the 
probability of two independent events, A and B, both occurring, 
given the occurrence of a third event, C, is 
disutility matrix. Arguably, one of the purposes of the jury system is to obtain community 
opinion on the relative disutilities, which can be expected to equal D only infrequently. But 
we instruct juries in terms that reflect disutility matrix D. For example, we generally do not 
instruct juries that they are permitted to place their own valuation on the possible outcomes. 
Nor do we inform them of the existence of insurance. This policy is exquisitely expressed in 
criminal litigation when we refuse to instruct juries about the possibility of jury nullification. 
Moreover, the disutility should be equal to D for the abstract case. If we are rational 
decision-makers, and.if there is no reason to prefer plaintiffs over defendants or vice versa as a 
general matter, then, without knowing anything else about the individual case other than that 
it is a civil case, the disutility matrix should equal D. 
Another way to state the preceding argument is that, to the extent we do not want to func-
tion with a disutility matrix D, the task of assigning values to the possible outcomes belongs to 
a jury studiously instructed that it is bound not to do so. Because the rule of law called the 
Bemhard doctrine assigns those values in a way which, from the perspective of juries as a 
whole, is chaotic and irrational, it is inconsistent with the burden of persuasion in the opera-
tional sense. 
There is still another qualification to the assertion that the burden of persuasion is the 
embodiment of disutility matrix D. This Note carefully avoids the use of the term burden of 
proof in order to maintain the distinction between the burden of production and the burden of 
persuasion. But verdicts are probably directed in a fashion that cannot be fully explained by 
the burden of persuasion. That is, verdicts will be directed because a party has failed to meet 
his or her burden of production even though a reasonable juror could find for that party on the 
existing evidence and a rational view of the likelihood of historical events in light of that 
evidence. In this way, the verdict is employed not merely to shift losses on the basis of fmd-
ings of historical fact, but also to secure the sort of evidence on which we want to base verdicts. 
That the burden of proof has this dual aspect in no way alters the strength of the claims made 
in this Note with respect to the burden of persuasion. Further, the Bemhard doctrine has no 
function with respect to the burden of production. 
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P(A & BIC) = P(AIC) • P(BIC) 
EQUATION 1 
625 
Bayes' Theorem provides a method for determining how new in-
formation alters existing probabilities. Assume that I is the initial 
known state of affairs, E is some piece of evidence or additional 
knowledge, and S is the event in whose occurrence or nonoccurrence 
we are interested. If P(E & 11S) = P<EIS) • PCTIS) and P(S & IIE) = 
P(SIE) • P(IIE), that is, if I is independent of E and of S, then it 
follows from Bayes' Theorem that: 
P(SIE) = P(EIS) • P{SID 
P(EII) 
EQUATION 2 33 
These two rules for deriving unknown probabilities from known 
probabilities will be used in the next subsection to derive a measure 
for the efficacy of the trial process. Ultimately, this standard will be 
applied to civil litigation under Bernhard and under the mutuality 
doctrine to support the conclusion that the Bernhard doctrine is un-
sound. 
B. A Measure of Trial Efficacy 
Thus far this Note has shown that the error minimizing strategy 
is basic to the fundamental values underlying civil litigation. This 
subsection will demonstrate that in light of that strategy the most 
rational disposition of a given case is the one that would be in accord 
with the majority view if the case were tried indefinitely. It will also 
show that the standard of accordance with the majority also provides 
a useful measure of trial efficacy. Constructing such a measure is 
• P(BIA) • P(A) 
33. According to Bayes' Theorem, P(AIB) = P(B) 
Thus P(SIE) = P(E!S) • P(S) Since I is independent of S and E, P(l!S) = P(IIE). 
' P(E) 
Therefore: 
P(E!S) • P(l!S) • P(S) 
P(SIE) = P(l!E) • P(E) 
P(IIS) • P(S) 
P(E!S) • P(I) 
P(IIE) • P(E) 
P(I) 
P(EIS) • P(SII) 
P(EII) 
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critical, because a trial is a striking example of a situation in which 
the accuracy of the guess or outcome cannot be determined after the 
fact. 
Professor Brainerd Currie begins his analysis of the Bernhard 
doctrine by stating an obvious principle: · 
We cannot know in terms of absolute truth whether the actor commit-
ted the wrong or not. Courts can only do their best to determine the 
truth on the basis of the evidence; and the first lesson one must learn 
on the subject of res judicata is that judicial fmdings must not be con-
fused with absolute truth. 34 
Professor Currie's simple lesson, by its very modesty, obscures a sub-
tle but critical distinction. The problem for purposes of finality is 
not human error but human inconsistency. A case might be liti-
gated and relitigated indefinitely, always with the same result, with-
out providing any assurance that the trier of fact has determined the 
"truth." In such a world, the obvious strategy would be to give 
every judgment the broadest possible preclusive effect because in fu-
ture litigation every issue will, by hypothesis, be decided the same 
way. Judicial decisions, however, are not perfectly reproducible. 
Given that successive trials of the same issue are unlikely to yield the 
same result indefinitely, the central question of collateral estoppel 
becomes how much weight to give a single determination when a 
retrial may yield a different verdict neither more nor less likely to be 
"true" than the first.35 
To state the matter another way, for purposes of finality there are 
two uncertainties inherent in the trial system. One is the uncertainty 
about absolute truth, which presumably cannot be determined in a 
subsequent trial with any greater certainty than that which the initial 
trial affords. The other uncertainty is whether a given verdict is 
even in accordance with what would be the majority outcome if the 
case were tried a very large number of times, ie., uncertainty 
whether a given verdict is our collective best guess. 
Unlike the truth about whether the actor committed the wrong, it 
is always possible to improve our knowledge about whether a given 
trial outcome is our collective best guess merely by successively re-
trying the case. Each outcome provides additional evidence of what 
the majority viewpoint would be if the case were tried an indefinite 
34. Currie, 9 STAN. L. REv. 281, supra note 3, at 314-15. 
35. Some verdicts may be more suspicious than others because of procedural defects in the 
conduct ofthe trial. Flaws in the process aside, however, every verdict is as worthy of respect 
as another. To argue otherwise is to suppose that there is some method, apart from litigation 
itself, with at least a marginally greater likelihood of arriving at the truth. If such a method 
exists, one wonders why it does not co=end itself to the courts and the legislatures as a 
superior method of resolving disputes. 
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number of times. The greater the number of trials, the less likely it 
is that the relative frequencies of verdicts for the plaintiff and of ver-
dicts for the defendant actually obtained will vary significantly from 
the ultimate distribution, and the greater will be the accuracy of our 
best guess. 
To illustrate the effect of subsequent trials upon our knowledge 
about the relative frequencies of verdicts, and thus upon our best 
guess, assume that, a priori, cases in which a verdict for plaintiff 
would be rendered 50% of the time are as prevalent as cases in which 
a verdict for plaintiff would be rendered 75% of the time, 90% of the 
time, or any other percentage of the time. In other words, assume 
that all relative frequencies of verdicts are equally likely.36 When 
the outcome of a single trial is known, however, it provides informa-
tion that indicates that a relatively frequency above 50% on behalf of 
the winning party is more likely to be the actual frequency than is a 
36. Relative frequency is a continuous variable from O to l, and, as such, there are an 
infinite number of relative frequency values. If a finite value of probability were associated 
with each of the infinite number of values of relative frequency between O and 1, the total 
probability would be infinite. But in any probability function the total probability must be 
finite, so that the function can be normalized. Thus, a probability cannot be stated for every 
relative frequency value. 
There is, however, a finite probability density for each value of relative frequency which 
can be used to determine the finite probability of a relative frequency falling within a given 
interval. That is, there is a finite probability that the relative frequency will fall within the 
interval .5 to I (or any other interval), but there is only a probability density associated with 
each of the relative frequencies within that interval. The probability for a given range of 
relative frequencies is found by integrating probability density over the relative frequencies in 
the interval. 
For example, the probability of S (the state of affairs in which a verdict for one party, 
X, is in the majority [in the interval .5 to I]), given only I (the initial state of affairs in 
which all relative frequencies of verdicts are equally likely), is determined as follows: 







where p is the relative frequency and d(p) is the probability aensit1,. (a constan~ D, since, 
·ven I, all relative frequencies are equally likely). In o~e~ ~ords, 1t ;l e9-ually likely that a 
~rdict for Xis in the majority as it is likely that the verdict 1S m the mmo?ty. (Hereafter, the 
al f o will be set equal to 1 for the sake of convenience and because with D equal to 1, the 
;ro~:~ility density functions are normalized-the total probability is equal to 1.) 
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frequency below 50%, thus changing the probability of various rela-
tive frequencies of verdicts for the plaintiff. 37 The magnitude of this 
change can be calculated by the use of Bayes' Theorem. 
In applying Bayes' Theorem, we will use the following notation: 
let p be the probability that a given verdict will occur in a particular 
case; let d(p) be the probability density that a case with a given 
probability, p, will occur; let S be the state of affairs in which a ver-
dict for one party, say X, is in the hypothetical majority and thus is 
the best guess; let I be the initial state of affairs in which all relative 
frequencies of a verdict for X are equally likely; and let E represent 
a single verdict for X. Bayes' Theorem can now be used to calculate 
the change from P(SII) (the probability that a verdict for X is the 
best guess, given the initial assumption about the relative frequencies 
of such verdicts) to P(SIE) (the probability that a verdict for Xis the 
best guess given the new information that the first trial resulted in 
such a verdict). 
The initial component in Bayes' Theorem, P(SII), is equal to .5, 
since one half of the "equally likely" frequency distribution of ver-
dicts for X satisfies the condition that Xis the majority verdict.38 
This value for P(SII) is illustrated in Graph A by the fact that the 
region to the right of p = .5 is equal to one-half of the total area. 
D 
d(p) .SD 
0 .25 .5 
p 
GRAPH A 
Graph A is useful for demonstrating the values for the remaining 
components of the Bayesian equation. The shaded area represents 
37. Of course, any change in the probability of relative frequencies of verdicts for the 
plaintiff results in a corresponding change in the probability of relative frequencies of verdicts 
for the defendant. 
38. See example in note 36 supra. 
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the portion of all judgments for each frequency distribution that re-
sults in a verdict for X. Thus, by way of example, where p = .25, 
25% of the verdicts are for X, and the height of the curve is one-
fourth the height of the initial distribution; where p = .5, 50% are for 
X, and the height of the curve is one half the height of the initial 
distribution. Since under the initial assumption each value of p is 
equally likely, the shaded region equals one half the total area. Thus 
P(EII)-the probability of a verdict for X given I-is equal to .5.39 
The state of affairs defined as S is represented by the region of 
Graph A where p is greater than .5, that is, where a verdict for Xis 
in the majority. Seventy-five percent of this region is shaded, indi-
cating that P(EIS) = .75.40 On the basis of the values for P(SII), 
39. 11 
P(Ell) == 0 d(p)dp 
/4~p 
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P(Ell), and P(EIS), Bayes' Theorem indicates that P(SIE) = .75,41 i.e., 
that the probability that a verdict for Xis in the majority given such 
a verdict in the first case is .75. Graphically, P(SIE) is represented by 
the ratio of the shaded area in Graph A that is to the right of p = .5 
to the total shaded area. 
Since this analysis is unaffected by whether X is the plaintiff or 
the defendant, it can be stated generally that, given the assumption 
that, a priori, all relative frequencies are equally likely, the 
probability that the outcome of a single trial will be in accordance 
with the majority view is .75. If each claim is tried once and only 
once, judicial determinations will be erroneous 25% of the time in 
the sense that they will not conform to our collective best guess 
about the truth. 
More information about the actual relative frequency of verdicts 
can be obtained, and thus the error rate can be reduced, if each claim 
is tried more than once. Graph B represents the situation after two 





The curve defining the upper boundary of the shaded area is p2, i.e. , 
the compound probability density of two successive trials resulting in 
a verdict for X when the probability density of such a verdict in a 
single trial is p and the two trials are independent.42 The 
41. Application of Equation 2 (text at note 33 supra) results in 
P(EIS) • P(S11) 
P(SIE) = P(EII) 
.75 X .5 
.5 
= .75 
42. P(E & Ell) = P(EII) • P(EII) (Equation 1). When working with probability densities, 
to determine compound probabilities the densities are first multiplied and then integrated over 
the relevant interval. Thus, P(E & Ell) = /21 p • pdp. 
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probability that the decision in the two cases is in accord with the 
majority view is .875,43 the ratio of the shaded area that is to the 
right of p = .5 to the total shaded area. If, on the other hand, the 
two trials resulted in one verdict for X and one for the other party, 
the curve would be 2p(l-p ), as in Graph C. In that situation, the 
outcome of the two trials tells us nothing more about the majority 
Where the trials are civil trials, rather than coin-flips, independence means that the out-
come of one trial does not influence the outcome of any subsequent trial. However, the liti-
gants, particularly the common party, may learn from preceding trials. To the extent that the 
common party can alter the probability in his favor, the results derived here overstate the 
effect of the Bernhard doctrine. This Note thus assumes that the relative magnitude of any 
change in favor of the common party is small. This cannot be proved but seems intuitively 
clear. 
43. P(Sfl) = .5 (note 36 supra) 
P(E & Efl) = Jc/ p2dp (note 42 supra) 
P(E & EfS) 




P(E & EfS) • P(Sfl) 
P(E & Efl) 
~ X.5 
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outcome because one half of the shaded area is to the right of .5 and 





As the case is tried more and more times, the curve begins to form a 
peak at some point and to grow narrower, and more of the total area 
44. - 11 P(E & Ell) = p(l-p)dp 
0 
P(E & EIS) 
=_.e:_.£:_11 





P(S11) = .5 
1 
(i X .5 
P(SIE & E) = ---r-
6 
=.5 
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under the curve concentrates around the peak.45 As this occurs, the 
shaded portion under the curve inevitably becomes concentrated in 
one half of the graph or the other. Consequently, we can more cer-
tainly identify the majority view, and errors become less likely. 
The distinction between uncertainty about the truth and uncer-
tainty whether a given verdict is in accordance with the majority out-
come must be borne in mind. Professor Currie's maxim reminds us 
that judicial fmality is not based on the conviction that we have 
found the truth with certainty.46 The assumption that the court has 
done its best to determine the truth does not, however, mean that 
nothing more can be done, for a subsequent trial does add to our 
knowledge. Thus far, truth and the best guess have been treated as 
unrelated. If, however, we believe that our subjective best guess 
bears any consistent relationship to the truth-the only justification 
for spending money and time on a trial-then each trial, by adding 
to our knowledge of the best guess, adds to our knowledge of the 
truth.47 
That each trial adds to our knowledge about the best guess does 
not mean it is reasonable to try a case indefmitely. Knowledge is 
expensive, and a point exists beyond which further expenditures are 
not justified. As a general matter this Note agrees that the marginal 
return in reduced error from a second trial is not justified in light of 
the marginal cost.48 That this general rule is not invariably correct 
will be shown subsequently.49 What is most critical at this point is 
45. The actual relative frequency for the case can thus be fixed with a high degree of 
confidence within an increasingly narrow interval as the number of trials increases. 
46. See text at note 34 supra. 
47. This Note assumes that, while we cannot know the truth with certainty, we are never-
theless concerned with finding the truth. Insofar as we are capable of ascertaining the truth, 
that end is furthered by choosing as the basis of decision the view of historical fact that we 
deem most likely to be the case. 
A more cynical view is that only the popular perception that the trial system finds the truth 
to the extent possible and people's consequent belief that their actions will have predictable 
judicial consequences are important. The measure of trial efficacy proposed here is compati-
ble with either view because it takes as its standard the belief that would be held by the major-
ity of juries if the case were tried an indefinite number of times-that is, it takes as its standard 
the popular conception of the truth. 
48. While, for example, in the sitµation posited earlier in this discussion, see notes 40-43 
supra and accompanying text, the first trial substantially increases the accuracy of our best 
guess from 50% to approximately 75%, a 50% improvement, two trials, each resulting in a 
verdict for the same party, only increase the accuracy of our best guess from .75 to .875, an 
increase of .125, or a 17% improvement. 
49. Given the constraints of due process, which prevents preclusion of nonparties, we must 
either conduct additional trials in "mutuality" situations or suffer greater-error than that which 
is ordinarily entailed by a single trial of a single claim. Thus successive trials are conducted in 
the special case of multiple claims out of a need to maintain the usual error rate, not in an 
attempt to achieve a greater accuracy. See generally text at notes 100-03 i'!fra. 
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that, while the standard of truth provides no measurable rate of error 
because we cannot in principle know which verdict the truth sup-
ports, the standard of accordance with the majority does provide a 
measurable rate of error because we can, in theory, "know" the ma-
jority view to any arbitrary degree of certainty. It is in this sense, 
then, that the standard of accordance with the majority provides a 
measure of trial efficacy with which to evaluate Bernhard and the 
mutuality doctrine. 
II. THE MEANING OF THE DOCTRINE OF MUTUALITY OF 
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL 
A. Traditional Criticism of the Bernhard Doctrine 
A brief review of some of the early criticism of Bernhard pro-
vides a foundation for the application of the principles developed in 
the preceding section to the mutuality requirement and the Bernhard 
doctrine. Aside from the fundamental argument that a requirement 
of mutuality is necessary to achieve the equitable distribution of liti-
gation risks, other arguments against its abandonment have been ad-
vanced: 
(1) It is argued that the abandonment of mutuality is not neces-
sary in order to prevent multiple harassment, one of the traditional 
objects of collateral estoppel generally.so 
(2) The abandonment of mutuality is said to be inherently in-
consistent with the principles of in personam jurisdiction.s1 
(3) It is claimed that the abandonment of mutuality may, per-
versely, increase litigation even though the number of trials is de-
creased. s2 
(4) Finally, it is said that the abandonment of mutuality inequi-
tably burdens the common party's litigation resources and prevents 
him from allocating those resources rationally and efficiently.s3 
While these arguments are not without merit, they are not com-
pelling. 54 Thus, a convincing case against the abandonment of mu-
tuality must be based primarily on the claim that abandonment 
unjustifiably alters the distribution of litigation risks among the par-
ties involved. 
50. Moore & Currier, supra note 1, at 308. 
51. Id. at 301, 310. 
52. Polasky, supra note 1, at 220. 
53. Greenebaum, supra note 6, at 15. 
54. The arguments against the abandonment of mutuality are criticized in Appendix A 
infta. 
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Ironically, the most telling criticism of the abandonment of mu-
tuality has been raised by Professor Brainerd Currie, perhaps the 
most vigorous champion of Bernhard. The abandonment of mutual-
ity leads to what Currie dubbed the "multiple-claimant anomaly."55 
In his now famous example, a train derailment leaves fifty passen-
gers injured: 
[T]wenty-five passengers, in twenty-five separate actions, all fail to es-
tablish negligence on the part of the railroad. Then passenger No. 26 
wins his action. Are we to understand that the remaining twenty-four 
passengers can plead the judgment in case of No. 26 as conclusively 
establishing that the railroad was guilty of negligence, while the rail-
road can make no reference to the first twenty-five cases which it won? 
There is only one possible answer to this question: no such absurd-
ity would be tolerated for a moment. The indefensibility of such a 
result seems obvious.56 
In forcefully rejecting the arguments of some commentators in sup-
port of the application of Bernhard in the train hypothetical,57 Cur-
55. Currie, 9 STAN. L. REv. 281, supra note 3, at 285. 
56. Id. at 286. 
The elementary requirements of due process, of course, prevent the railroad from pleading 
any favorable judgment against a subsequent plaintiff who was not a party or in privity with a 
party to the action in which the judgment was rendered. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 
(1940). 
57. See, e.g., Comment, Privily and Mutuality in the .Doctrine of Res Judicata, 35 YALE L.J. 
607, 612 (1926) (citations omitted): 
It may be argued that this unduly oppresses the defendant, since in each suit he must 
defeno to the utmost and always has everything to lose and relatively little to gain. 
Should he win the first suit, however, the benefit of the experience will enable hiIIi the . 
more readily to defend the others, and should he lose, it wilfbe only after a fair OPJ?Ortu-
nity to defend, and he ought not to complain ifhe is bound by a judgment against rum on 
the merits. If [there is] no injustice in forcing a defendant to figlit [fifty] plaintiffs at once, 
with all staked upon the issue, there would seem to be none in forcing a party to stake all 
upon one fair liti~ation where he has only a single opponent. In addition, there is a 
considerable public advantage in the reduction of litigation. 
Currie's response to this argument is a sardonic jewel: 
Does such an argument require an answer? It may, indeed, be argued that such a rule 
"unduly oppresses" the defendant. He is required to defend every suit to the utmost, 
risking everything against the chance of winning as to a single claim. And how is he to be 
compensated for the imposition of this perilous disaavantage? Forsooth, by the 
experience he gains if he wins the first suit-an experience which is his under the estab-
lished rule whether he wins or loses; an experience which is valueless to him ifhe loses the 
first suit; an experience which is offset, to say the least, by the "experience" which accrues 
to the remaining [forty-nine] plaintiffs as they hold back, without risk, and make notes 
while the case is defended "to the utmost"; an experience which, at best, is scant J>rotec-
tion against the probability that, sooner or later, some jury in one of the remaining [forty-
nine] cases will exercise its prerogative to view the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the plaintiff, no matter how ably experienced counsel conducts the defense. The assur-
ance that, if the defendant loses, it will be only after a fair opportunity to defend, has a 
seductive sound; the author has conveniently ignored the fact that the defendant had not 
one but . . . twenty-six "fair opportunities to defend," in only one of which he failed. 
Can it still be said that he ought not to complain if the twenty-five successful outcomes are 
ignored, and the one aberrational verdict is elevated to the status of objective truth? 
The argument ends lamely on the plaintive note that ''there is a considerable public 
advantage in the reduction of litigation." Why, so there is, and no doubt it would be to 
the public advantage if there were no liti&ation at all; but the question is, at what point 
does the public interest in reducing litigation yield to the interest in fair procedure? 
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rie makes two points important both to his initial attempt to limit 
Bernhard and to his later reversal of that position. The first point is 
that where the common party is the defendant, as in the train hypo-
thetical, the plaintiffs possess the initiative-a "priceless strategic ad-
vantage"-and may bring suit in a forum inconvenient to the 
defendant or in one which makes it possible to take advantage of a 
case with factors exciting sympathy for the plaintiff.58 His second 
observation strikes directly at the heart of Bernhard, a fact that Cur-
rie apparently does not perceive: 
If we are unwilling to treat the judgment against the railroad as res 
judicata when it is the last of a series, all of which except the last were 
favorable to the railroad, it must follow that we should also be unwill-
ing to treat an adverse judgment as res judicata even though it was 
rendered in the first action brought, and is the only one of record. Our 
aversion to the twenty-sixth judgment as a conclusive adjudication 
stems largely from the feeling that such a judgment in such a series 
must be an aberration, but we have no warrant for assuming that the 
aberrational judgment will not come as the first in the series. Indeed on 
the basis of the considerations [with respect to the plaintiffs possession 
of the initiative], the judgment first rendered will be the one least likely 
to represent an unprejudiced finding after a full and fair hearing.59 
Although Currie is loathe to preclude the defendant under such 
circumstances, he is convinced that "[t]he basic doctrine of the 
Bernhard case is sound"60 and that "[t]here is no virtue in the mutu-
ality requirement as such."61 He attempts, therefore, to distinguish 
Bernhard from his train hypothetical by subjecting the Bernhard 
doctrine to two narrow exceptions. First, the plea of collateral es-
toppel should not be allowed where the plea would create an anom-
aly such as would occur in the railroad hypothetical, i.e., ''where the 
party against whom the plea is asserted faces more than two successive 
actions. "62 Second, since the principle of collateral estoppel as-
sumes "that the party against whom the plea is asserted has had a 
Currie, 9 STAN. L. REv. 281, supra note 3, at 287. 
58. Currie, 9 STAN, L. REV. 281, supra note 3, at 288. 
59. Id. at 289 (emphasis added). Although it is not possible to determine when a particu-
lar judgment is an aberration, Currie in effect suggests it is possible to tell when it is not, since 
he claimed there is no risk of the multiple claimant anomaly when there are only two claim-
ants. See text at note 62 infra. Apparently he believed that a result that is not in the minor-
ity of the cases actually tried cannot be anomalous. Under this reasoning, if there are only 
two trials, no single outcome can be anomalous, there is no risk of giving an amomalous out-
come preclusive effect, and there is no reason to withhold the full force of the Bernhard doc-
trine. But this is just a manifestation of Currie's confusion between risk and outcome, for the 
presence or absence of a third claim cannot affect the risks that the common party must bear in 
the first two suits. 
60. Id. at 308. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. (emphasis added). 
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full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue effectively . . the plea 
should not be allowed, where, by. . . reason of his former adversary's 
possession of the initiative, he has not had such an opportunity."63 
Irritated by Currie's assertion that courts would not or could not 
weigh fair and full opportunity to litigate case by case and unim-
pressed by Currie's analysis,64 courts have generally rejected Currie's 
suggested limitations on the application of Bernhard.65 In United 
States v. United Air Lines, Inc., 66 for example, a case not unlike Cur-
rie's railroad hypothetical, the airline, having litigated and lost the 
issue of negligence, was estopped to relitigate even though the plain-
tiffs could not have been bound by the prior judgment; there was a 
risk of the multiple-claimant anomaly in that the airline potentially 
faced more than two successive actions; and the airline, as the de-
fendant, had not enjoyed the initiative in the prior suit.67 
If, as will be shown later,68 Currie's initial error was his failure to 
realize that the implications of his limitations to Bernhard required 
complete rejection of the doctrine, that error was compounded by his 
subsequent abandonment of these two limitations in Civil Procedure: 
The Tempest Brews.69 In abandoning his offensive/defensive dis-
tinction,70 Currie cited United Airlines as an example of a case 
where, despite the defensive posture of the common party, the court 
properly concluded that the defendant had enjoyed an impeccably 
full and fair opportunity to make its defense. 71 Abandonment of the 
offensive/ defensive distinction on the ground that courts have 
63. Id. (emphasis added). This exception is co=only referred to as the offen-
sive/defensive distinction, since it provides that Bernhard should not be applied when a non-
co=on party seeks to use a prior judgment offensively. 
64. As Currie explains it, the difficulty in the railroad case is that the judgment which is 
given preclusive effect is the one we have the most reason to suspect. If that is the thrust of his 
concern, his solution-that we apply Bernhard only when there are no more than two 
claims-is unresponsive to the problem. See text at note 59 supra. The number of outstand-
ing claims has no logical relation to the degree of confidence to be accorded the most recent 
judgment. 
65. See, e.g., Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944, 956 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 
934 (1964). 
' 66. 216 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. Wash., D. Nev. 1962), qffd as to res judicata and mutuality sub 
nom. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 951 
(1964). 
· 67. See Currie, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 25, supra note 3, at 34. In addition, the case had been 
decided by a jury, a factor which has been relied on to prevent preclusion. See also Bemer v. 
British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532, 539-41 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 
382 U.S. 983 (1966). 
68. See text at notes 75-76 infra. 
69. 53 CALIF. L. RE.v. 25, supra note 3. 
70. See note 63 supra and accompanying text. 
71. Currie, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 25, supra note 3, at 36. 
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proved capable of evaluating whether the common party had a full 
and fair opportunity to litigate is not, however, inconsistent with 
Currie's initial rationale for this exception to Bernhard. More sur-
prising w~s Currie's .abandonment of the exception on behalf of a 
common party facing more than two opponents. Although as origi-
nally stated this constraint appeared to relate to the possibility that 
the outcome rather than the procedure of the initial trial might be 
unrepresentative, Currie subsequently treated the exception as noth-
ing more than another "rule of thumb" designed, like the offen-
sive/ defensive distinction, to prevent a judgment based on less than 
a full and fair opportunity to litigate from being given preclusive 
effect.7a 
Currie's final position with respect to collateral estoppel, then, 
embraces Bernhard with only one qualification, one which he read 
as implicit in the Bernhard decision: that it should not be applied to 
work injustice.73 In other words, preclusive effect should be denied 
only where the common party against whom the prior judgment is 
asserted did not have a fair and full opportunity to litigate the is-
sue. 74 
72. [F]or essentially the same reasons [full and fair opportunity to litigate], the court did 
not concern itself with any such limiting concept as the multiple-claimant anomaly. We 
have merely to permit ourselves to consider the actual circumstances of the case to appre-
ciate the absurdity of any suggestion that the Los Angeles verdict was an "aberration," 
and certainly there was no collusive maneuvering by the plaintiffs to select an oppressive 
forum for a test case. 
Id. at 36 (emphasis added). The confusion between the lack of full and fair opportunity and 
the possibility that a given outcome is unrepresentative is apparent. 
73. Currie, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 25, supra note 3, at 37. 
74. See id. at 31. Currie's perception of the problem has completely dominated the de-
bate, even when his conclusion is challenged. In a real sense, Bernhard itself is not debated at 
all. Only Currie's description of Bernhard, see note 72 supra, is debated, but it is precisely his 
description that is at fault. His critics have lost before they have begun because they have 
failed to free themselves from the constraints of his full and fair opportunity analysis, He is 
convinced that the crux of the issue is whether or not the party to be precluded has received a 
full and fair opportunity to litigate. What Currie has done is to analyze Bernhard in terms that 
make its problems appear to be fully analogous to those of collateral estoppel generally. Thus, 
attacks on Bernhard are perceived to be attacks on collateral estoppel and both judges and 
commentators come to believe that one cannot be rejected without rejecting the other-policy 
arguments in favor of collateral estoppel can be enlisted in support of the Bernhard doctrine 
without qualification and are deemed to be persuasive. 
His first solution-mechanical rules designed to aid the courts in avoiding a case-by-case 
analysis of whether there has been a full and fair opportunity to litigate, see text at notes 62-63 
supra,-was swept aside by the courts, which felt they could do justice without the benefit of 
rigid formulae. See Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934 
(1964); United States v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. Wash., D. Nev. 1962) 
ajfd. as to res judicata and mutuality sub nom. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F,2d 379 
(9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 951 (1964); Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co., 58 
Cal. 2d 601, 375 P.2d 439, 25 Cal. Rptr. 559 (1962). Yet, they did so without questioning 
Currie's basic premise. But that premise obscures the fact that the question of fair opportunity 
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As the next subsection will demonstrate, Currie's initial suspicion 
of the outcome dictated by Bernhard in his railroad hypothetical was 
well founded. His subsequent rejection of the offensive/defensive 
distinction was proper in the sense that whether the common party is 
a defendant facing multiple claims or a plaintiff seeking to assert 
related claims against multiple defendants does not affect the impact 
of the abandonment of the mutuality requirement. However, aban-
donment of this distinction calls not for the application of the Bern-
hard doctrine in every case, but rather for the application of the 
mutuality requirement. Contrary to the assumption apparently un-
derlying Currie's second initial exception to Bernhard, the case 
against the abandonment of mutuality does not depend on there be-
ing an "aberrational" outcome, or the risk of such an outcome, in a 
particular trial. The common party is unjustly burdened, although 
we have no more reason to be suspicious of the preclusive judgment 
than we are of any other judgment. More particularly, the common 
party is unjustly burdened by the abandonment of mutuality 
whether there are two claims or fifty.75 
Focusing specifically upon Currie's two initial qualifications to 
the abandonment of mutuality is perhaps unfair, since he later 
claimed that these exceptions were inspired by an underlying con-
cern for ensuring a full and fair opportunity to litigate. However, 
even Currie's final position, that preclusive effect should be denied 
only absent a full and fair opportunity to litigate, is not responsive to 
the fundamental problem, for the inequitable burdens imposed upon 
the common party by the abandonment of mutuality are not elimi-
nated by a requirement that the common party have enjoyed a full 
and fair opportunity to litigate. The common party should not be 
precluded unless both the mutuality requirement and the full and 
fair opportunity test have been satisfied.76 
does not speak to the issues raised by his multiple-claimant anomaly, see text at notes 107-18 
infra. 
As a result, the courts failed to ask whether full and fair opportunity has any particular 
relevance to the problems of mutuality and thus whether mutuality should be abandoned at 
all. Having lost the battle but won the war, Currie applauded the farsightedness of the courts 
who saw past his "cynical" reservations, and he regretted that he had suggested them in the 
first place. Currie, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 26, supra note 3, at 29, 32. 
75. See text at notes 87-103 infra. 
76. See note 109 infra. 
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B. A Probabilistic Analysis of the Bernhard .Doctrine 
1. The Abandonment of the Mutuality Requirement 
The central theme of mutuality is the fair apportionment of trial 
risks. By potentially precluding either party (if both would have 
been bound) or neither party (if either party would not have been 
bound), mutuality allows litigation risks to reflect only the merits of 
the cases. The abandonment of mutuality alters the litigation risks 
by forcing only one party to face the potential of preclusion in subse-
quent litigation, thus shifting additional risks to that party. In addi-
tion to altering the distribution of risks between the parties, the 
Bernhard doctrine affects the measure of trial efficacy by generally 
increasing the error rate.77 
To see more clearly and to what extent mutuality and Bernhard 
affect the allocation of litigation risks, consider the result in two hy-
pothetical multiple litigation situations that differ only with respect 
to the presence or absence of the mutuality requirement. Because 
Currie initially suggested that Bernhard produces no objectionable 
results when the common party is the protagonist,78 as have other 
commentators,79 it will be assumed in both hypotheticals that a com-
mon party plaintiff seeks to assert related claims80 against a series of 
defendants. As will become apparent, this assumption does not af-
fect the alteration of trial risks produced by Bernhard.81 
Assume also that the plaintiff has a fifty percent probability of 
winning his case, that is, that if the case were tried indefinitely, the 
plaintiff would be successful fifty per cent of the time.82 The gen-
eral result reached in this analysis is independent of the particular 
probability selected83-the fifty per cent figure is employed for ease 
of calculation and because under such an assumption no single out-
11. See text at notes 100-04 i'!fra. 
78. Currie, 9 STAN. L. R.Ev. 381, supra note 3, at 316. 
19. See, e.g., Semmel, supra note 1, at 1466-67. 
80. "Related claims" denotes claims with a sufficient common basis to create a collateral 
estoppel problem. For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that the common questions are 
dispositive of each case. 
81. See text at notes 89-90 i'!fra. 
82. This hypothesis can only be hypothetical, since a case can hardly be tried indefinitely. 
Nonetheless, the only essential assumption is that there is some probability that the plaintiff 
will succeed, even if the probability can never be known exactly. Moreover, it can be known 
to any arbitrary degree of certainty. See text at notes 37-49 supra. 
83. If p is the common party's probability of success in a single trial, the probability of 
recovering on a single claim is p. The expected percent of recovery on n claims under mutual-




p<l and n > 1 implies !L pi < p. 
i=l 
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come is anomalous in the sense that it is contrary to the majority 
verdict. Initially, the significance of the total number of cases will 
be ignored. It is assumed that the plaintiff has ten claims, each liq-
uidated84 in the amount of $100. As with the probability of aver-
dict for the plaintiff, the amount of the claim has no bearing on the 
general conclusions of the analysis. 
The impact of a full and fair opportunity to litigate will be ana-
lyzed separately in a subsequent subpart. For present purposes, the 
fifty percent probability of a verdict for the plaintiff common party is 
taken to be the result of all causes, including those that might lead a 
subsequent court to conclude, under a full and fair opportunity anal-
ysis, that preclusive effect ought to be denied a prior judgment for 
one of the defendants. Thus, the rule of collateral estoppel will be 
treated as operating mechanically. 
Finally, assume that no defendant is in privity with any other 
defendant, so that under the traditional mutuality doctrine, as well 
as under Bernhard, the common party plaintiff will not be able to use 
a favorable judgment against one defendant to preclude any other 
defendant from relitigating the common issue. Given this set of as-
sumptions, if each case is tried separately85 and preclusive effect is 
denied for lack of mutuality, all ten cases will be litigated.86 By hy-
pothesis, the plaintiff can expect to win fifty percent of his cases for a 
total expected recovery of $500. This result is illustrated in the mu-
tuality column of Table I. 
On the other hand, under Bernhard, once the plaintiff loses one 
case, he will be precluded from· litigating the remaining cases. 
While the probability of winning any single case that is litigated is 
still fifty percent, the preclusive effect of a single loss makes the 
probability of ever litigating a case dependent upon the outcome of 
previous cases. This cumulative effect reduces the common party's 
Thus, the mere fact that the common party faces multiple claims reduces his chances on the 
merits for all values of p. 
84. If the claims were unliquidated, the model would become unnecessarily complicated 
by the addition of a function representing the probability of recovering a particular award. 
Assigning a different value to each claim would make the ultimate average recovery turn on 
the order in which the cases were tried without, however, affecting the general conclusion. 
85. The,effects ofjoinder will be discussed in text at notes 91-94 infra. 
86. In reality, after a few claims have been litigated and the parties have learned the rela-
tive strength of their cases, they might decide to settle or abandon the remaining cases. On the 
other hand, if all parties were aware of the actual probability of success before incurring any 
litigation costs (and were equally risk averse), they logically should agree to settle for precisely 
the expected recovery or loss. But for purposes of this analysis it is assumed that each of the 
ten claims is litigated. 
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MUTIJALllY BERNHARD 
Cumulative Cumulative 
Recovery if Probability of Expected Expected Probability of Expected Expected 
Trial win trial winning trial Recovery Recovery winning trial Recovery Recovery 
1 $100 .5 $50 $50 .500 $50.00 $50.00 
2 $100 .5 $50 $100 .250 $25.00 $75.00 
3 $100 .5 $50 $150 .125 $12.50 $87.50 
4 $100 .5 $50 $200 .063 $6.30 $93.80 
5 $100 .5 $50 $250 .031 $3.10 $96.90 
6 $100 .5 $50 $300 .016 $1.60 $98.50 
7 $100 .5 $50 $350 .008 $.80 $99.30 
8 $100 .5 $50 $400 .004 $.40 $99.70 
9 $100 .5 $50 $450 .002 $.20 $99.90 
IO $100 .5 $50 $500 .001 $.IO $100.00 
Total expected recovery $500 $100.00 
TABLE I 
expected recovery from $500 to $100, as illustrated in the Bernhard 
column of Table I. s7 
87. The probabilities reflected in the Bernhard column involve the calculation of the 
probability for a compound event, such as "plaintiff wins exactly three trials," from the 
probability that the plaintiff wins a single trial, in this case .5. For purposes of illustration, 
assume initially that the mutuality doctrine is applicable, so that a loss will not prevent the 
occurrence of subsequent wins. 
Where two events are independent, as these trials are assumed to be, the probability of 
both occurring is the product of their probabilities, see text preceding note 33 supra. To 
calculate the probability of three wins followed by seven losses, the probability of a win is first 
multiplied by itself three times, P", and then multiplied by the probability of a loss multiplied 
by itself seven times, (1-p)IO-n. However, there are many ways to win exactly three cases. 
The ten events can occur in any order. The total number of ordered arrangements of ten 
events is ten factorial, IO!. Thus, the probability of three wins and seven losses is added to 
itself ten factorial times, that is, it is multiplied by 10!. Finally, account must be taken of the 
fact that some arrangements are redundant. For example, taking the order W-W-L-W and 
switching the first two elements does not yield a new arrangement. Thus, to eliminate multiple 
counting of a single ordered arrangment, the total number of ordered arrangements must be 
divided by the number of arrangements of the wins among themselves, n!, and by the number 
of arrangements of the losses among themselves, (IO - n)!. 
The result is 
c(n) = pn(l-p)IO-n 10! 
n!(IO-n)! 
where c(n) is the compound probability, pis the probability in the individual case, and n is the 
number of wins in the compound event. Since p = (1-p) = .5, the formula can be simplified: 
c( ) - 510 • 10! n - · n!(IO-n)! 
Under Bernhard, there is only one possible way to reach each outcome. For example, in 
order to win exactly four cases, the plaintiff must win the first four and lose the fifth. Thus, 
the probability of n wins is simply P"(l-p) = _5n+1. 1?1e last case is ~culated <ii!ferentl_Y 
because it cannot be followed by a loss and need not be m order to termmate the senes. It IS 
therefore calculated by P"· 
An alternative method of illustrating the decrease in expected recovery under Bernhard is 
to consider the probability that the plaintiff will recover from a given number of defendants. 
Table A below shows the probability, when there are 10 defendants, of the plaintiff prevailing 
over any given number of them under mutuality. Again, assume a 50% case. 
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When the probability of wining a single case is initially assumed 
to be fifty percent, each successive claim under .Bernhard is worth 
only half as much to the plaintiff as its predecessor because it is that 
much less likely that he will be able to recover. The presence of the 
preceding claims decreases the probability that the common party 
will recover on succeeding claims. The impact of the .Bernhard doc-
trine is dramatic and can be evaluated in terms of expected recovery 
rather than mere conjecture.88 
No. of Probability Maximum Recovery Expected Recovery 
Wins (P) (R) (P • R) 
0 .001 -0- -0-
I .010 $ 100 $ I 
2 .044 200 9 
3 .117 300 35 
4 .205 400 82 
5 .246 500 123 
6 .205 600 123 
7 .117 100· 82 
8 .044 800 35 
9 .010 900 9 
IO .001 1000 I 
1.000 $500 
TABLE A 
When mutuality is required, subsequent defendants cannot raise an estoppel based on the 
plaintifi's loss of a prior case. For example, there are many ways for the plaintiff to win 
exactly five cases. He can win the ill'St five, the last five, every other case, and so forth. On 
the other hand, under the Bemhard doctrine there is only one way for the plaintiff to win five 
cases. He must win the ill'St five cases and lose the sixth. The results of the trials are no 
longer independent. There is a flat rule that every case following a loss to the plaintiff also 
results in a loss. The effect on the relative frequencies and the expected recovery is illustrated 
in Table B. 
No. of Probability Recovery Expected Recovery 
Wins (P) (R) (P • R) 
0 .500 -0- -0-
1 .250 $ 100 $ 25.00 
2 .125 $ 200 $ 25.00 
3 .063 $ 300 $ 18.90 
4 .031 $ 400 $ 12.40 
5 .016 $ 500 $ 8.00 
6 .008 $ 600 $ 4.80 
7 .004 $ 700 $ 2.80 
8 .002 $ 800 $ 1.60 
9 .001 $ 900 $ .90 
10 .001 $1000 $ 1.00 
1.001* $100.40* 
• The excess over one and the excess over $100 are caused by rounding off the individual 
probabilities. 
TABLEB 
88. The fact that cases will be settled on the basis of calculations of the potential liability 
discounted for the trial risk does not impair the argument. No doubt, the ill'St verdict will so 
crucially affect settlements that even without Bemhard there will often be only one trial. Fur-
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Table I also refutes Currie's assumption that the multiple-claim-
ant anomaly is avoided ifthere are only t'\\'.O claims. Since the exist-
ence of subsequent claims does not affect the expectation value of 
preceding claims, the expectation value of the second claim is the 
same whether there are two claims or ten. Thus, the situation in 
which there are only two claims is not fundamentally different from 
that in which there are ten. The total expectation value of two 
claims is simply the sum of the expectation values of the first claim 
and of the second claim. This sum is $100 under mutuality and only 
$75 under Bernhard. While the decrease in total expected recovery 
is not as spectacular when there are two suits rather than ten, the 
effect of the Bernhard doctrine is hardly insignificant. 
Although the common party in the preceding analysis was a 
plaintiff (for the purpose of demonstrating that the multiple-claim-
ant anomaly is not limited to the case in which the common party is 
the defendant, as in Currie's railroad hypothetical),89 the conclusions 
reached were without reference to the trial role of the common party. 
ther, the settlement value to the non-common parties increases if the first verdict is in favor of 
the first non-common party. While the initial expected recovery on outstanding claims may 
be only 50%, after the first trial it may rise to 75%. See text at notes 38-41 supra. (Apart from 
the psychological rewards of going to trial, parties refuse to settle because they disagree on the 
expected recovery and because they are insufficiently risk-averse to make adequate conces-
sions. Attempts to bluff and to maintain credibility may also prevent the parties from reach-
ing a mutually advantageous bargain.) 
The Bernhard doctrine affects settlement negotiations in two ways. First, it increases the 
risk to the common party. The common party is thus impelled to accept a less advantageous 
settlement than under mutuality. For example, where there are five claims at stake each 
worth $200, and the common party's risk ofloss is .5, the amount effectively at risk in the first 
case climbs from $200 to $387.50. See Appendix B infra. The common party should there-
fore be willing to settle for up to $193.75 rather than $100. How much of the surplus the non-
common party is able to extract will depend on how risk-averse the parties are and how hard-
nosed a bargainer the non-common party is. Second, Bernhard denies the common party the 
full benefit of a favorable judgment. While the common party's risk in a single trial may fall 
from .5 to .25 after an initial victory, Bernhard still increases the overall risk thereafter from 
what it would have been under mutuality following an initial victory. Settlement negotiations 
should reflect the additional risk. 
89. Currie argues that there is reason to think that a defendant who has lost in the first case 
has received less than a full and fair opportunity to litigate and that the judgment is therefore 
more likely than succeeding judgments to be anomalous. But if there is an overall bias in 
favor of plaintiffs, as Currie seems to suppose, that provides no basis for thinking that the 
verdict in the first case for a plaintiff is less than representative. By hypothesis, the result is 
likely to be reproduced in subsequent litigation, unless Currie supposes that pro-plaintiff bias 
is peculiar to the first suit in the series. There is some indication, however, that that is pre-
cisely what he believes. He is concerned that the plaintiffs, by their use of the initiative, can 
select the case least favorable to the defendant as the "test case." See Currie, 9 STAN. L. R.Ev, 
281, supra note 3, at 288-89. This is but another example of a persistent theme of the law of 
collateral estoppel-that the judgment relied upon must be representative. 
While Currie's reasoning justifies his offensive/defensive distinction, see note 63 supra 
and accompanying text, he also used it to support his multiple-claimant anomaly excep-
tion-yet in his example of the anomaly, the first loss did not occur until the 26th suit. See 
text at notes 55-59 supra. Had Currie stopped before taking this last step, his multiple-claim-
ant anomaly argument would have been a reasonably petsuasive, if somewhat informal, state-
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If the common party were defending, the only difference in the hy-
potheticals would be that the recovery would become the loss 
avoided. Where, as here, the Bernhard doctrine diminishes a com-
mon plaintiffs expected recovery from $500 to $100, it would in-
crease a common defendant's losses from $500 to $900. Thus, except 
to the extent that the initial trial posture bears on whether the com-
mon party has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate,90 trial pos-
ture is irrelevant to the alteration of litigation risks attributable to 
Bernhard. 
The argument advanced by one commentator:-that the result 
produced by Bernhard is no worse than forcing a common party to 
litigate all claims at once so that any recovery is dependent upon that 
single outcome91-is, as Professor Currie argued,92 incorrect. If, in 
the hypotheticals, all defendants were joined in a single suit so that 
each would be bound by an adverse judgment as well as benefitted 
by a favorable one, the plaintiffs expected recovery would be $500.93 
Thus, the expected recovery when all of the defendants are joined in 
a single action is the same as it would be if the suits were tried sepa-
rately under mutuality, but it is not the same as it would be if they 
were tried under Bernhard.94 There is a vast difference between 
compelling a litigant to accept an all-or-nothing bet with even odds, 
as joinder rules do, and weighting the odds heavily in favor of his 
opponent, as the Bernhard doctrine does. 
As has been shown, the common party class is inevitably victim-
ized by the Bernhard doctrine,95 at least absent the requirement to be 
discussed in the next subsection that the common party not be pre-
cluded unless he has previously enjoyed a full and fair opportunity 
to litigate. The question remains, however, whether this alteration 
of litigation risks merely causes a random shifting of losses between 
ment of the basis for the mutuality doctrine. His argument, however, is hopelessly entangled 
with the question of full and fair opportunity. See note 76 supra. • 
Indeed, in a subsequent article, Professor Currie repudiated his own offensive/ defensive 
distinction but concluded that mutuality should be abandoned in either event. Currie, 53 
CALIF. L. REv. 25, supra note 3, at 28-29. 
90. See text at notes 107-18 iefra. 
91. See Comment, supra note 57, at 610-11, discussed in note 57 supra. 
92. Currie, 9 STAN. L. REv. 281, supra note 3, at 287. 
93. The expected recovery would be $1000 (the amount at stake against all IO defendants) 
times .5 (the probability of a verdict for the plaintiff common party), or $500. 
94. See Table I supra. 
95. Besides altering the distribution of the loss (recovery) between the common and non-
common parties, the Bemlrard doctrine also produces a less equitable distribution among com-
mon parties similarly situated. For example, consider the situation in which common party 
plaintiffs each have a 90% chance- of success in a single suit. The table below contains the 
frequency distribution, with and without mutuality, in such a situation. 
646 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 76:612 
equally worthy parties,96 a shifting which would have no impact on 
the overall rate of error, or whether the Bernhard doctrine produces 
measurably more erroneous awards. As will be demonstrated be-
low, the latter is the case: Bernhard increases the error rate. 
Recall that, in terms of the error minimizing strategy, the ideal 
distribution of outcomes awards all judgments to the parties who 
would be favored by the majority if their cases were tried indefi-






































With mutuality, the probability that a plaintiff with such a strong case will lose everything is 
negligible, and the reasonably likely outcomes are clustered closely about nine. (This cluster-
ing becomes more pronounced as the number of cases grows larger. The deviation from the 
mean as a percentage of the total number of cases grows smaller.) Under Bernhard, however, 
a significant percentage of the plaintiffs recover nothing, while others, similarly situated, win 
all ten cases. The results are fairly well distributed among the outcomes in between. 
Joinder, see text at notes 91-94 supra, also results in different treatment of similarly situ-
ated common parties. If, in the preceeding example, each plaintiff joins his ten claims, or is 
compelled to do so, he faces only two possible outcomes-he wins all or nothing. Thus, under 
joinder, plaintiffs, although similarly situated with respect to the strength of their claims, could 
recover very different amounts. On the average, nine will cover the full amount, and one will 
recover nothing. 
96. For example, this alteration of litigation risks might reduce the expected recovery of a 
common party with a 60% case, only to offset this result by increasing the expected recovery of 
a noncommon party with a 60% probability in another case. Although this may be inequitable, 
it does not increase the error rate as it has been defined. Both 60% cases should yield a 100% 
recovery. See notes 24-32 supra. Thus, any alteration of the distribution between them is 
zero-sum with respect to error. 
97. It might at first appear that if the case is a 60-40 case in terms of probability of success, 
the error minimizing strategy would call for a 60-40 split of the recovery. Such a split is not 
called for if error is measured by the amount of damages awarded erroneously (as compared to 
the manner in which they would be awarded if the facts were known with certainty). Note 
that uncertainty about the facts is not a basis for compromise in the sense that comparative 
fault is. Assuming that the chances of success are a reasonable approximation of the subjec-
tive degree of certainty of the triers of fact (this need not be so, since in 60% of the cases the 
jurors might be 80% certain of one conclusion, while in 40% they might be 80% certain of the 
opposite conclusion) then 60% of those with a 60% case should receive a 100% recovery while 
40% should take nothing. Awarding 100% to all of them thus yields a 40% error rate. 
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shaded section represents awards for the common party. There are 





As demonstrated earlier, Graph A illustrates the distribution of 





Area II represents erroneous judgments in favor of the non-common 
party-erroneous in the sense that the probability of a verdict for the 
common party is greater than .5 and that the best guess would there-
fore be a judgment for the common party. Similarly, Area III repre-
sents erroneous verdicts for the common party. Together these two 
areas account for 25% of all cases.98 Graph A can represent a single 
If the award is compromised on the basis of the degree of uncertainty so that all of the 60% 
cases are awarded a 60% recovery, the amount correctly awarded is 36%, and the amount 
incorrectly awarded is 24%. The 40% parties who benefit from the compromise are awarded 
40%. With a compromise, the amount correctly awarded is 16%, and the amount incorrectly 
awarded is 24%. Thus with a compromise in damages based on uncertainty about the facts, 
the aggregate rate of error rises from 40% to 48%. In other words, error minimiziue requires 
the best guess, not a compromise. 
The interest that such a compromise could reflect is the litigants' interest in avoiding risk. 
By compromising on the basis of uncertainty, the risk of error overall is increased but the 
magnitude of errors when they occur is decreased. The opportunity for settlement, however, 
already accommodates this interest. 
98. Although the error rates derived herein depend on the a priori assumption that all 
relative frequencies are equally likely, see text at note 36 supra (it may well be that 40% and 
60% relative frequencies are more likely than others), they do provide a rough measure of the 
range in which the trial system operates. 
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claim or multiple claims under the mutuality doctrine. In either 
case, the expected average recovery (as a percentage of a total recov-
ery) is represented by the line separating the shaded and unshaded 
regions. 
If verdicts were decided at random, the distribution of outcomes 
would be that suggested by Graph E. 
d(p) 
I II 
0 5 1 
p 
GRAPH E 
The erroneous awards are still represented by Areas II and III, 
which together account for 50% of all cases. Thus, the effort ex-
pended in a single trial is aimed solely at decreasing the error rate 
from 50% to 25%.99 
The Bernhard doctrine alters the distribution of outcomes in the 
manner represented by Graph F .100 
99. Indeed, if we had a flat rule that one party, plaintiff or defendant, always wins, the 
distribution would be represented by an entirely shaded square. The errors would be repre-
sented by the left half of the square rather than diagonally opposed quadrants, but the error 





100. This graph represents a generalized illustration of Table I supra. The information in 
Table I with respect to the probability of the common party winning the nth trial is essentially 
a vertical slice out of Graph F taken at the point p=.5. The intersection of the diagonal line 
with the vertical line at p=.5 represents the .5 probability of winning the second case under 
mutuality, while the intersection of the curved line with the vertical line at P"",5 corresponds to 
the pn probability that the common party will succeed in the nth trial under Bemltard. 
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If there are two claims, the expected average recovery for the com-
mon party on the first claim is simply p, his probability of winning. 
On the second claim, however, the expected average recovery is p2• 
The expected average recovery for a third claim would be p3, and so 
forth, as illustrated earlier in Table I for p = .5. Since p is less than 
one, each successive claim is worth less than its predecessor. In con-
trast, under mutuality each claim is worth the same, as reflected by 
the probability of success. The total expected average recovery is 
less under Bernhard than under mutuality because that figure, under 
either doctrine, is simply the sum of the expected recoveries for the 
individual claims. 
Ideally, some of the common parties who recover under mutual-
ity should not recover. Region V represents the reduction in the 
number of errors that can be attributed to the Bernhard doctrine. 
Area VI, however, represents the additional errors incurred by virtue 
of Bernhard. To the extent that Area VI exceeds Area V, Bernhard 
results in a measurable increase in the number of errors. IOI 
101. The area between the two curves for n number of claims can be found by integrating 
the difference between them, n 
(p-¼ L pi). 
i=1 
n n 
fa- ¼ ~ pi(dp) = r -!i L r:; = F(p) 
1=1 i=l 
Area VI equals F(1) - F(.5). Area V equals F(.5) - F(0). F(0)=0. Thus, the increase in the 
error rate, Area VI less Area V, equals 
n n 
F(1) - 2F(.5) = (.5 - ,l ' ...L) - 2(.125 - l '~) n L_ 1+1 n L_ i+l 
i=l i=1 
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Recall that even in the worst case, in which verdicts are entirely 
random, the error rate can increase by a maximum of only 25 per-
centage points, from 25% to 50%.102 If there are three claims, the 
Bernhard doctrine results in a 1 % increase in the error rate. With ten 
claims, the error rate increases by 9 percentage points, and when 
there are twenty claims, the error rate rises by 14 percentage points, 
almost 60% of the maximum increase of 25% that would result if 
decisions were made entirely at random. 103 
n 
1 ~ 1-.51 
.25-ii L T+f 
i=l 
102. This statement also applies when verdicts are decided in favor of one party under a 
per se rule. See note 99 supra. 
103. Using the formula in note 101 supra for determining the increase in the error rate, the 
increase under Bernhard when there are three claims is 
3 
.25-l ~..!::2'... 
3 L_.i+ 1 
i=l 
= 25 _ l. ( 1-.5 + 1-.25 + 1-.125) 
. 3 2 3 4 
= .25-.24 
= .01. 
For 10 claims, the increase is 
10 
1 ~ 1-.51 
.25-w L T+I 
i=l 
= 25 _ L ( t-.5 + t-.25 + 1-4.125 + + ~) . 102 3 ..• 11 
= .25-.16 
= .09. 





_ 25 _l._ 1,1-.5 + ~+ ~ + + l-.520) 
-. 20'-2 3 4 ••• 21 
,;,= .25 - .11 
= .14. 
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That the Bernhard doctrine causes additional errors104 is not 
And when the increase in the error rate under Bernhard is calculated for Currie's example of 
the multiple-claimant anomaly, see text at note 56 supra, the result is 19%: 
50 
I~ l-.5i 
·25 - 50 L_ i + I 
i=I 




. 50 2 3 4 
= .25 - .06 
= .19. 
Interestingly, when there are only two claims the number of new errors under Bernhard is 
just balanced by the number of errors avoided. This might seem to vindicate Currie's later-
repudiated recommendation against applying the Bernhard doctrine when the common party 
faced more than two potential adversaries. Using the formula in note 101 supra, we see that 
the change in the error rate when there are two claims is 
2 
.25-l ~ ~ 
2L._ i+I 
i=I 
= _25 _ ! l 12.5 + l-;-25) 
I = .25 -2 (.5) 
= .25 - .25 
=0. 
Elementary notions of equity, however, suggest that offsetting the reduction in the common 
party plaintiff's expected recovery by the increase in the expected recovery of noncommon 
party plaintiffs is less than fair, even though the overall rate of error is unchanged by any 
potential distribution of recoveries between the two. See note 96 supra. This is particularly 
true since the common party under Bernhard has to bear the costs of at least one trial while 
one of the noncommon parties will not incur any trial costs. 
104. Currie's reluctance to give preclusive effect to an "anomalous" result, see text at note 
59 supra, suggests a strategy less extreme than Bernhard, that would decrease the amount of 
litigation, would mitigate the harshni:ss of Bernhard, and would improve the error rate. That 
strategy is to take advantage of the additional information generated by additional trials. The 
common party would be precluded whenever he has lost a majority of the cases previously 
litigated. The majority must consist of at least two cases. (This rule would bar preclusion in 
one of the situations in which Currie was once willing to permit it-in the case of two claims.) 
To see how this strategy would work, consider the results where the common party poten-
tially faces six claims. A verdict for the common party will be denoted by v, a verdict for the 
noncommon party by v. p(v) (or p(V)) will represent the probability of a given verdict, c(v) 
the probability that a given verdict is correct. The expected recovery, r(v), is the sum of the 
possible probabilities of a given verdict multiplied by the amount at stake. r(v) • c(v) and r(V) 
• c(v) are, respectively, the expected recovery from a correct verdict for the common party and 
for a noncommon party. Their sum is the expected recovery from all correct verdicts, thus 
representing the overall success rate in choosing the correct outcome. The following table 
presents the values for these probabilities and success rates. 
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counter-intuitive. The Bernhard doctrine increases consistency by 
PERCENTAGE OF CORRECT VERDICTS 
Trial r(v) c(v) r(v) • c(v) r(v) 
I .5 .75 .375 .5 
2 .5 .75 .375 .s 
3 .417 .84 .35 .583 
4 .35 .90 .31 .65 
5 .3S .90 .31 .65 
6 .329 .93 .31 .671 
TABLED 
These values were derived as follows: 
Win all six: 








p(v) = p6 
p(v) = 5p5(1-_p) 
r(v) • c(v) + 







This is multiplied by a factor of five because v can occur in any one of the first five trials. 
Lose two of first five: p(v) = 7p4(1-p)2 
With two verdicts for the non-common parties the situation is complicated by the fact that if 
both occur within the first three trials the common party is precluded thereafter and cannot 
win.the sixth trial. There are ten ways of arranging the two losses within the first five verdicts, 
three of which result in losing two of the first three cases. Since three of the ten arrangements 
are forbidden, given the premise that the common party wins and thus gets to the sixth trial, 
the factor is seven. This general approach results in the following probabilities of verdicts for 
the common party in each trial: 
1 p(v) = p 
2 p(v) = p 
3 p(v) = pl+ 2p2 (1-p) 
4 p(v) = p4+ 3p3 (1-p) 
5 p(v) = pS+ 4p4 (1-p) + 3p3(1-p)2 
6 p(v) = p6+ 5p5 (1-p) + 7p4(1-p)2 
The expected recovery by the common party where the amount at stake in each claim is equal 
r(v) = 1 • J ~(v)dp. 
0 
The percentage of correct judgments where the outcomes are v and v respectively are 
c(v) 
;;(v)dp 
= .,,.5..__, __ 
f;(v)dp 
1.5 1 - p(v)dp 
c(v) = -o ___ _ 
£~ -p(v)dp 
The error rate calculated as 1-(r(v) • c(v) + r(v) • c(v)] can be expected to remain stable at 
22% for the following reason. The minimum requirement for preclusion is that the common 
party lose two out of the first three cases, which yields a success rate of 78%. Occasionally, 
more than three trials will be conducted because the common party will win two, and there 
will be noncommon parties who have not litigated and who cannot, therefore, be precluded. 
The rate is stable because, as the number of litigated claims increases, it &:comes increasingly 
less likely that an "aberrational" (in the sense that it is less than 50% likely) majority in favor 
of the noncommon parties will occur. 
To state the matter another way, under Bernhard the probability that the common party 
will be precluded never decreases because any loss results in preclusion. Under the suggested 
rule, the percentage of wins and losses tends to stabilize at whatever the underlying probability 
is. As the number of cases litigated grows it requires a larger variation in absolute numbers 
from this percentage, to give the noncommon parties the transient majority on which preclu-
sion of the common party can be based. As the size of the required deviation increases, it 
becomes increasingly less likely that it will occur. 
Note, too, that if the rule initially called for a simple majority, rather than at least two out 
of the first three, the error rate would stabilize at 25%, the normal rate under mutuality. 
This suggested approach overcomes the adverse affect Bernhard has on the error rate. The 
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simply estopping the common party. But like the consistency of a 
rule that the plaintiff always wins, the consistency achieved by 
Bernhard is unrelated to the persuasiveness of the case. Bernhard is 
merely a per se rule, a bias favoring the noncommon party. 105 Only 
the fortuitous circumstance that he faces multiple opponents subjects 
the common party to outcomes that are consistently less favorable. 
The outcome of subsequent trials under Bernhard tells us only what 
we already knew, that the common party is the common party. 
Since that information bears no consistent relationship to the merits 
of the case, 106 errors are more prevalent under Bernhard. The differ-
ence in the common party's recovery, as exemplified in Table I, 
quantifies the extent to which the aggregate outcome under Bernhard 
reflects our best judgment on the merits and the extent to which it 
merely reflects the anti-common party bias. 107 
2. Full and Fair Opportunity To Litigate 
The unqualified abandonment of mutuality causes intolerable in-
equities and diminishes the accuracy of the trial process. Does the 
difficulty with the approach is thus purely a matter of equity. No shifting of losses between 
parties equally worthy, whether those parties are common parties, noncommon parties or a 
combination of the two, can adversely affect the rate of error. See note 96 supra. But of 
these two possibilities, equal recovery by equally worthy parties is to be preferred. Yet, under 
the proposed rule of preclusion an increasing proportion of the correct awards goes to the non-
common parties (r(v)), even though the overall rate of correct verdicts remains stable at 78%. 
(Note the shift between columns r(v) and r(v) in the table above.) 
105. The judicial system, like any system designed to organize information, is prone to two 
sorts of errors: randomizing errors and biases. A randomizing error decreases the consistency 
of the outcomes; it dissipates information. A bias, on the other hand, has informational con-
tent, but that information is legally irrelevant. 
A randomizing error forces relative frequencies toward 50%. At that point no informa-
tional content can be attributed to the trial outcomes taken as a whole. Thus, ifwe are to have 
confidence in our determinations, we must strive first of all for consistency. But, consistency 
alone is not enough. We must seek to achieve a consistent product without introducing biases 
to which the consistency may be attributed. For example, a rule that a plaintiff always wins 
will yield perfectly consistent results. Under the absolute bias favoring the plaintiff, the infor-
mational content of the trial product is at a maximum. But what does the process tell us? 
Simply what we already knew-that the plaintiff always wins. Rather than reflecting our best 
judgment about the evidence available to us, the result is attributable to factors entirely irrele-
vant to the merits. 
J06. If the information does bear a consistent relationship to the merits of the case it is 
redundant, since the trier of fact will have used the information in reaching a verdict. 
107. The purpose of adopting 50% as the probability for the hypothetical in the text can 
now be better understood. The 50% case is the equipoise case, the case neutral on the merits. 
Thus, any deviations in outcome from 50% provide an estimate of the magnitude of the bias 
introduced by Bemhard unskewed by the merits. 
An ordinary litigant with a claim as strong as his opponent's suffers no such disability. 
But the more "common" the common party, the more the aggregate outcome reflects the 
Bemhard bias. The greater the number of related claims, the greater the prejudice to the 
common party, as Table I demonstrates. When there are only two claims the average reduc-
tion is 25%, as compared to an 80% reduction when there are ten, although in each case the 
total amount at stake is the same. 
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full and fair opportunity test ameliorate these problems? Critics 
have complained that the mutuality doctrine is too mechanical a 
rule, that it denies courts needed flexibility. 108 Commentators have 
proposed that the flexible tool which modem justice requires would 
be a rule that precludes a party who has litigated and lost unless, by 
design or circumstance, that party has been denied a full and fair 
opportunity to litigate.109 The appeal of such an approach is obvi-
ous. On its face, Bernhard rejects a black letter rule, which by virtue 
of its very simplicity is presumed to be inadequate, in favor of a 
standard which, by virtue of its complexity, is presumed to reflect 
more accurately the policies of res judicata. In assessing the effect of 
the Bernhard doctrine on the distribution of risks, it was initially as-
sumed that the full and fair opportunity test is always satisfied. The 
conclusions reached under this assumption are sufficient to demon-
strate the flaws in Bernhard even when the full and fair opportunity 
test is incorporated in that doctrine. 110 As long as there are some 
cases in which the test will be met and in which the common party 
108. See, e.g., Note, Collateral Estoppel· The Changing Role of the Rule of Mutuality, 41 
Mo. L. REv. 521, 529 (1976). 
109. See Currie, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 25, supra note 3, at 28-29. q. the statement in Note, 
supra note 108, at 529: "[C]ourts should proceed on a case by case basis and consider the 
particular facts of each case in determining whether mutuality should be required." The im-
plication of this statement is that there are some circumstances under the full and fair opportu• 
nity test in which preciusion would be permitted but for the fact that mutuality is lacking. 
Some support for this implication is found in REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS app. 
§ 88 (Tent Draft No. 3, 1976). But even if mutuality has some role to play under the full and 
fair opportunity analysis, it is not through a case-by-case determination of whether mutuality 
is required. The Restatement full and fair opportunity test is, rather, a case-by-case determi• 
nation of whether preclusion should be permitted in which mutuality is but one of a list of 
factors to be taken into account 
110. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS app. § 88 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1976); text 
at note 74 supra. 
The deficiencies in a prior trial that would lead a court to find there was not a full and fair 
opportunity to litigate are not the kind which would subject the prior judgment to collateral 
attack or even to reversal on appeal. 
A comprehensive list of the various factors which should enter into a determination 
whether a party has had his day in court would include such considerations as the size of 
the claim, the forum of the prior litigation, the use of initiative, the extent of the litigation, 
the competence and experience of counsel, the availability of new evidence, indications of 
a com_promise verdict, differences in the applicable law and forseeability [sic] of future 
litigation. 
Schwartz v. Public Admr., 24 N.Y.2d 65, 72, 246 N.E.2d 724, 729, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955, 961 
(1969). Six of the nine factors listed above relate either to the magnitude of the liability that 
would be thought to hinge on the outcome of the initial trial, or to the conduct of the trial 
participants that would ordinarily depend heavily on the magnitude of that liability, such as 
the extent of litigation, the experience of counsel or a compromise verdict. In other words, 
these six factors are directed at ensuring that the conduct of the trial that is to be relied on did 
not vary substantially from what might be expected if the participants had been consciously 
litigating both claims. The question of full and fair opportunity is simply whether the prior 
suit may be considered a fair representative of the trial to be precluded. See also REsTATE• 
MENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS app. §§ 68.1, 88 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1976) (listing factors to be 
considered in determining whether there has been a full and fair opportunity to litigate), 
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has some chance of winning on the merits, Bernhard will reduce that 
chance by precluding the common party after just one loss. Thus, 
unless the Bernhard supporters are prepared to maintain that all in-
consistencies in outcome are attributable to the lack of full and fair 
opportunity (ie., that the evidence itself is never ambiguous), so that 
a party who loses after a full and fair opportunity to litigate would 
never have won the case even if it were relitigated indefi-
nitely, m Bernhard's supporters must concede that preclusion will al-
ter the common party's risks. 
Discussion need not be limited to those cases for which the full 
and fair opportunity standard is met, however, since the probabilistic 
model can be adjusted to take the full and fair opportunity test into 
account. Initially, it was assumed that the fifty percent probability 
that the common party will lose a given case is attributable to all 
cases. But trials can be separated into two classes, those that meet 
the full and fair opportunity test and those that do not. Under the 
Bernhard doctrine, only those in the former class are given preclu-
sive effect. Since another contingency apart from a favorable judg-
ment-ie., lack of full and fair opportunity-can frustrate 
preclusion, the common party's chances are slightly better than they 
would be if preclusion were automatic. Suppose, for example, that 
there is a ten percent chance that a loss by a common party with a 
fifty percent case will subsequently be denied preclusive effect be-
cause of a lack of full and fair opportunity. As Table II demon-
strates, if there are three claims for $100 each, the common party's 
recovery climbs from $87.50 under Bernhard applied mechanically 
to $92.63 under Bernhard with the full and fair opportunity test. 
The recovery under mutuality is $150.112 
Ill. This proposition is untenable, since a case submitted to a jury, for example, is by 
definition one about which reasonable persons might disagree. To argue that a determination 
that there was full and fair opportunity means that the losing common party never could have 
won is to argue that the previous trial should have resulted in a directed verdict for the non-
common party. Full and fair opportunity ensures that the risk of loss in the prior case was not 
disproportionate to the average risk ofloss. It in no sense guarantees that a case decided with 
full and fair opportunity will accord with the majority view. See note 109 supra. 
112. Calculating the probabilities under these circumstances is a considerably more com-
plex task, which is why Table II was limited to the case of three claims. For example, there 
are now several ways for the common party to lose all of the suits. He can lose the first case 
and have the subsequent courts fmd that he had a full and fair opportunity (preclusion), lose 
the first without a fair opportunity (no preclusion) and the second with a fair opportunity 
(preclusion), and so forth. Using W to indicate a win, and UL to indicate an unfair loss, the 
probabilities are calculated below. The probability of a win, as before, is assumed to be .5. 
He is precluded only by a "fair'' loss. 
There are two ways for the common party to reach the second suit. He can win t4e first, or 
he can lose the first without a full and fair opportunity: 
P(W) = .5 
P(UL) = .5 X .1 = .05 
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Bernhard without Bernhard with 
full and fair full and fair 
Trial 
Mutuality opportunity opportunity 
number R p P.R p P•R p P•R 
1 $100 .5 $50 .5 $50.00 .5 $50.00 
2 100 .5 50 .25 25.00 .275 27.50 
3 100 .5 50 .125 12.50 .1513 15.13 
$150 $87.50 $92.63 
TABLE II 
The assumption underlying Table II is that no relationship exists 
between the likelihood of success and the likelihood of a subsequent 
finding of full and fair opportunity. As a first order approximation, 
this assumption is useful, but it unrealistically implies that the fair-
ness of a trial is a random factor with no informational content rele-
vant to the likely or proper outcome of the trial. In reality there are 
three factors with which a determination of full and fair opportunity 
might be associated: the presence or absence of randomizing errors, 
the presence or absence of biases, and the merits of the case. 
The effect of denying preclusion by finding no full and fair op-
portunity in cases where lack of full and fair opportunity is posi-
tively correlated with the presence of a randomizing error can 
profitably be compared with the results under Bernhard when a de-
termination that there has been full and fair opportunity has no such 
correlation; under Bernhard applied without considering full and 
fair opportunity; and under mutuality. Suppose that overall the 
common party has a 80% case but that there is a 10% probability of a 
randomizing error. Further assume that this error is completely 
randomizing, that is, that the probability of winning a case in which 
the error appears is 50%.113 Table III compares the results under 
Thus, the probability that the common party will win the second suit is .5 x (.5 + .05) or .275. 
Similarly, the probability that the common party will reach the third suit is 
P(WW) = .5 X .5 = .25 
+ P(W UL) = .5 X .05 = .o25 
+ P(UL W) = .05 X .S = .o25 
+ P(UL UL) = .OS X .OS = .0025 
.3025 
The probability of winning the third suit is then .S x .3025 or .1513. 
The 10% figure is of course arbitrary. Additionally, there is no reason why it should re• 
main constant. Indeed, since the foreseeability of future claims is an important element of 
fairness, it would be an unusual case in which the common party could successfully raise the 
unfairness defense to preclusion more than once. However, the example serves to provide a 
fair estimate of how slight the effect of the full and fair opportunity caveat to the Bernhard 
doctrine is. 
113. If the overall probability of success is to be 80%, the probability of winning a case in 
which the randomizing error does not appear must be 83.3%. With W denoting a win, Re 
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each of the rules for three $ 100 cases.114 
denoting the presence of a randomizing error, and Re denoting the absence of a randomizing 
error, the probability of winning when there is no randomizing error is derived as follows: 
P(W) = P(WjRe) • P(Re) + P(WjRe) • P(:Ile) 
.8 = .5 x .1 + P(WIRe) x .9 
.8 = .05 + P(WIRe) x ·.9 
P(WjRe) = -~~ 
= .833 
114. Recall that in the previous example (under Bernhard with full and fair opportunity) 
there was a 10% chance that a loss by the common party would subsequently be denied preclu-
sive effect. See text at note 111 supra. Columns A, B and C simply reflect Table II supra 
adjusted for an 80% case. Thus, the values in column C are calculated as follows: 
The probability that the common party will win the second suit equals the probability of 
winning a given suit, .8, times the probability of reaching the second suit, (P(W) + P(UL)), or 
.8 X (.8 + .2X . 1) 
= .8 X .82 
= .656. 
Similarly, the probability that the common party will reach the third suit without being 
precluded is 
P(W W) = .8 X .8 
+ P(W UL) = .8 X .02 
+ P(UL W) = .02 X .8 






and the probability of winning the third suit is then .8 x .6724 = .5379. 
Column D represents the situation in which there could be a finding of lack of full oppor-
tunity (of which there is a 10% chance) only in cases in which a randomizing error is present 
(which changes the probability of success or failure to .5). Thus, the probability of reaching 
the second suit without being precluded is P(W) + P(UL), or P(W) + P(LjRe) • P(Re) 
= .8 + .5 X .} 
= .8 + .05 
_ = .85. 
Thus the probability of winning the second suit is 
= .8 + .5 X .1 
= .8 + .05 
= .85. 
Thus the probability of winning the second suit is .8 X .85 = .68. 
The probability of the common party reaching the third suit without being precluded is 
P(WW) 
+ P(WUL) 
+ P(UL W) 
+ P(UL UL) 
= .8 X .8 
=.8X.05 
= .05 X .8 






and the probability of winning the third suit is .8 X .7225 = .578. 
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A B C D 
B,rnhard with full 
B,rnluudwith &rnluud with and fair opportunity 
no full and fair full and fair related to a 
Trial Mutuality opportunity opportunity randomizing error 
No. Recovery p P • R p PeR p P•R p PeR 
1 $100 .8 $80 .8 $80.00 .8 $80.00 .8 $80.00 
2 100 .8 80 .64 64.00 .656 65.60 .68 68.00 
3 100 .8 80 .512 51.20 .5379 53.79 .578 57.80 
Total Expected Recovery $240 $195.20 $199.39 $205.80 
TABLE III 
The common party's expected recovery under mutuality is $240. 
Under Bernhard applied with no full and fair opportunity test the 
recovery is reduced to $195.20. Applying Bernhard with a full and 
fair opportunity test that randomly denies preclusive effect to 10% of 
the losses raises the recovery to $199.39. If, on the other hand, full 
and fair opportunity is related to a completely randomizing error so 
that only losses occurring in the 90% of the cases in which the ran-
domizing error is not present, are given preclusive effect, the recov-
ery is raised further to $205.80. Even if judges accurately employ 
the full and fair opportunity test to deny preclusive effect to judg-
ments arising from unrepresentative trials, full and fair opportunity 
cannot be a substitute for mutuality. Nor is mutuality merely a 
mechanical analogue of the full and fair opportunity test. The man-
ner in which their effects were calculated indicates that they are 
functionally quite different. Full and fair opportunity weeds out 
cases in which the common party was peculiarly unlikely to succeed. 
Mutuality harmonizes the outcomes of single party and multiparty 
litigation so that the trial system as a whole is coherent. 
If the errors are biases rather than randomizing errors, the spe-
cific figures may change, but the general principle remains the same. 
By selectively denying preclusive effect to a class of cases in which, 
because of the presence of some anti-common party bias, the com-
mon party is peculiarly likely to lose, the full and fair opportunity 
doctrine does more to improve the common party's chances than 
does the random denial of preclusive effect to the same number of 
cases. However, since the full and fair opportunity doctrine cannot 
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serve to permit the preclusion of any of the common party's oppo-
nents, and since the mutuality doctrine would deny preclusion alto-
gether, the full and fair opportunity doctrine, to the extent that it 
focuses on randomizing errors and biases that relate to procedural 
matters, can only mitigate the impact of the abandonment of mutu-
ality. 
The third possibility, however, is that a determination of full and 
fair opportunity is somehow related to the merits of the case. The 
full and fair opportunity doctrine might be employed to deny preclu-
sive effect whenever the prior judgment is unrepresentative in the 
fullest sense of the word-that is, whenever the judgment does not 
accord with the majority view. 115 Suppose that the full and fair op-
portunity test were 
1
perfectly discriminating: suppose, that is, that 
preclusion were never permitted against a common party with a bet-
ter than 50% case and were always permitted otherwise. The result-
ing distribution of awards is represented in Graph G, which is 
simply a combination of Graph A (the result under mutuality) for p 
greater than .5 and Graph B (the result under the abandonment of 
mutuality) for p less than .5. 
If, as is assumed in Graph G, a judge faced with a plea of collat-
eral estoppel were actually capable of discerning the majority view 
by reviewing the prior action for full and fair opportunity, the 
Bernhard doctrine would be wholly unobjectionable; Graph G ap-
proximates Graph D (the ideal distribution) more closely than does 
Graph A. Although the recovery for common parties with better 
than 50% cases cannot be increased beyond what it would be under 
mutuality, the common parties estopped to relitigate are those who, 
ideally, should not recover at all. Thus there is a decrease in the 
rate of error. 
But the full and fair opportunity test cannot be administered so 
as to reflect the merits of the case and thus to produce the results 
115. This may perhaps be what Currie meant by "aberration" when he spoke of denying 
preclusion to an aberrational case. In other words, he may have meant that an aberrational 
case is any verdict which is in the hypothetical minority, less than 50% likely, rather than one 
that is extremely unlikely. Indeed, he originally stated that our aversion to giving preclusive 
effect to a judgment which is in the actual minority of those tried to date (in his hypothetical, 
one out of twenty-six), stems from the conviction that it "must be an aberration." Currie, 9 
STAN. L. REv. 281, supra note 3, at 289. It is, of course, possible for someone with a 50% 
probability of winning to win only one out of twenty-six trials, but it is extremely un-
likely-the odds against it are 2,581,109:1. If Currie's language reflects an awareness of the 
implications of the distinction between risk and outcome, that awareness vanished in his sub-
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illustrated in Graph G. On its face, the test purports to concern 
itself with purely procedural matters116-randomizing errors and bi-
ases-the elimination of which cannot raise the recovery of a com-
mon party with better than a 50% case under Bernhard to the level 
ac~eved under mutuality.117 Moreover, if it were possible for the 
subsequent judge to determine whether the common party has a bet-
ter than 50% case and thus should be precluded, we could enjoy the 
ideal system contemplated by Graph D merely by having every case 
reviewed for full and fair opportunity. For a trial judge to relate 
full and fair opportunity to the merits of the preceding case is for 
him to make his own decision on the merits and then to invoke the 
prior judgment to justify his usurpation of the jury's function in the 
second case.118 Thus, unless it is expanded to unrealistic and unin-
116. See the factors to be.considered in determining whether there has been a full and fair 
opportunity to litigate set forth in REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS app. § 88 (Tent. 
Draft No. 3, 1976). 
117. See Table III supra. 
I 18. Where mutuality has been abrogated, courts are probably manipulating full and fair 
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tended dimensions, the full and fair opportunity element of 
Bernhard does not meet the objections to the abandonment of mutu-
ality. 
C. Summary of Objections to the Abandonment of Mutuality 
That Bentham's disparaging allusion to the gaming table should 
become the rallying cry of mutuality's critics119 is ironic, for there is 
no more persuasive argument on behalf of mutuality than that pro-
vided by the application of probability theory to litigation risks. 
While the bench may consider analogies between gaming and litiga-
tion unseemly, every trial lawyer knows that litigation is a gamble. 
Thus, it should not be surprising that elementary notions of fair play 
born at the gaming table find ready application at the bar. 
The central theme of mutuality is the fair distribution of litiga-
tion risks. As the previous subsection demonstrated, the abandon-
ment of mutuality significantly alters the distribution of such risks 
and imposes inequitable burdens on the party who faces multiple 
opponents. Only by ignoring or failing to recognize the risk alloca-
tion function of the mutuality requirement have the supporters of 
Bernhard been able to conclude that concern for judicial efficiency 
can justify abandoning mutuality. 120 The Bernhard doctrine is in-
opportunity to reflect their view of the merits of the case. Courts are able to do this because 
there are no articulated criteria for such judgments and because it is carried on sub silentio. 
For example, in Bemer v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532 (2d Cir. 
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 983 (1966), the court, in withholding preclusion, distinguished its 
ruling of the prior year applying Bernhard, Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 317 U.S. 934 (1964), on the ground that "the issues [in Zdanok]-interpretation of 
a collective bargaining contract-were not likely to be decided on the basis of a jury's choice 
among different factual inferences, as was the case here." 346 F.2d at 541. 
The court may have been suggesting that only those judgments that are unlikely to be 
decided differently in a subsequent proceeding ought to be given preclusive effect. The court 
implies that jury trials are more likely to result in inconsistent verdicts than bench trials and 
that the fact of a trial by jury is therefore a justification for withholding preclusion. More 
probably, courts may simply be more willing to find full and fair opportunity when they ap-
prove of the verdict in the first trial. But cf. Zdanok, 327 F.2d at 957 (Lumbard, J., concur-
ring) ("had it been proper for the district court to consider the additional proof adduced by 
the defendant at the second trial it seems to me to be clear beyond peradventure of a doubt 
that the [precluded party] profferred the only tenable view of the ... agreement"). 
Indeed, in Zdanok the court held that a new defense against a new plaintiff could not be 
raised only after it detailed the reasons why it remained unconvinced of the merits of Glid-
den's case. 327 F.2d at 951-56. 
119. See note 15 supra. 
120. Admittedly, the authors of the Second Restatement, unlike some early commentators, 
did not wholly ignore the issue of litigation risk when they adopted the Bernhard doctrine. 
A party who has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate an issue has been accorded the 
elements of due process. In the absence of circumstances suggesting the appropriateness 
of allowing him to relitigate the issue, tliere is no good reason for refusing to treat the 
issue as settled so far as he is concerned other than that of making the burden of litigation 
risk and expense symmetrical between him and his adversaries. Equivalence of litigating 
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compatible with the basic purpose of civil litigation, the equitable 
redistribution of losses. In addition, the Bernhard doctrine demon-
strably reduces the efficacy of litigation as a deterrent to anti-social 
conduct.121 
The concern for the wise use of judicial and private resources 
which motivates the supporters of Bernhard is certainly legitimate. 
However, the proper focus is not whether mutuality should be aban-
doned, but rather whether society's interest in conserving resources is 
great enough to justify more inclusive rules for compulsory joinder 
of parties. Serving that interest through compulsory joinder rather 
than by abandoning mutuality would avoid the inequities produced 
by Bernhard.122 Furthermore, to allow preclusion through the 
risk, while a proper element in determining whether preclusion should be imposed, is only 
one of several considerations relevant in determining the fairness of estopping a 
party .... 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS app. § 88 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1976). Since the prin-
cipal consequence of the abandonment of mutuality is the redistribution of litigating risks in a 
manner that, standing alone, is inequitable, it is not clear how the Reporters intend equiva-
lence of litigation risk to be weighed with other "considerations." The Restatement language 
is reminiscent of the discussion of symmetry in Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419,421 
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 865 (1950), see note 14 supra, and of Greenebaum on the costs 
of litigation, see Appendix A at notes A12-A1S. 
There are two possible explanations for the Reporters' position. First, insofar as they per-
ceive the matter as one of symmetry, the Reporters may regard the distribution of risks as an 
aesthetic matter. Compare the logical inconsistency that results when one of the railroad 
plaintiffs, see text at note SS supra, recovers damages and another does not. Although the 
losing railroad plaintiff may be understandably piqued at the inconsistent outcome, he cannot 
complain of an "erroneous" judgment in favor of another. His objection is merely that the 
outcomes are "asymmetrical." No pecuniary interest of his is affected. The fact remains, 
however, that where risk distribution is involved such asymmetries have material conse-
quences. 
The point is not that the risks must be symmetrical. The point is that the a priori burden 
of a party should not exceed .S. Where the suit is bilateral, symmetry of risk is only an 
incidental consequence. Where there are only two parties and one bears a risk of .S, the other 
must also bear a risk of .S. In multilateral situations the risk distribution is rarely symmetri-
cal, nor should it be. See text at notes 125-57 infra. 
The second possible explanation is that the Reporters are comfortable with imposing a 
greater than SO% initial risk in the name of fairness, efficiency, or whatever. While this may 
satisfy the requirements of due process as currently understood, see Blonder-Tongue Laborn• 
tories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971) (rejecting the mutuality 
requirement in patent ligitation), it is an inadequate notion of procedural impartiality. The 
only difference between risks is that the party burdened may have consented to one (or other-
wise have brought it upon himself) and not the other. In that case, the only relevant criterion 
is whether the party to be precluded could have joined the persons who seek the benefit of the 
judgment and so have avoided the risk. But under the proposed § 88, this, too, is but one 
factor to be considered. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS app. § 88(3) (Tent. 
Draft No. 3, 1976). 
121. See text following note 22 supra. 
122. See also notes 91-94 supra and accompanying text. Some commentators argue that 
compulsory joinder is not always just. See, e.g., Mccoid, A Single Package for Multiparly 
Disputes, 28 STAN. L. REv. 707, 726-28 (1976). McCoid suggests that mandatory joinder can 
cause claims to be lodged in inconvenient fora, can impair due process by overridingjurisdic-
tional limitations, can induce claims that might otherwise not have been asserted, and can 
deter the settlement of claims. 
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abandonment of mutuality where joinder is merely permissive is 
likely to discourage joinder and thereby frustrate economical use of 
judicial resources by multiplying litigation. For example, typically 
a common party defendant is not permitted to join all of the plain-
tiffs in a single action. This rule is designed to protect the plaintiffs' 
interest in managing their own litigation. The abandonment of mu-
tuality in the name of judicial economy, in such circumstances, re-
wards plaintiffs who exercise the prerogative to multiply litigation by 
giving them the benefit of a verdict for the plaintiffs with whom they 
chose not to join without requiring them to risk loss and preclusion. 
Even where the common party is a plaintiff, a nonparty defend-
ant who could not have been joined should not be allowed to take 
advantage of a judgment against the common party. The inability 
of the plaintiff to join a particular defendant is attributable either to 
jurisdictional barriers designed to protect the defendant or to pre-
vailing notions of prudent judicial administration. If the defendant 
avails himself of his rights and refuses to participate voluntarily, the 
plaintiff should not bear the cost of eliminating the additional litiga-
tion caused by the defendant. 
Whether the doctrine of mutuality of estoppel will be revived or 
will linger at the brink of death remains to be seen. The vitality of 
the mutuality requirement may well be mooted by developments in 
the rules ofjoinder.123 At the least, however, the critics of mutuality 
should not content themselves with an empty echo of Justice Tray-
It might additionally be argued that the judiciary should hesitate to create compulsory 
joinder when rules promulgated under legislative authority plainly contemplate permissive 
joinder, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 20. 
123. One writer has suggested maintaining the mutuality doctrine in order to encourage 
those able to do so to join all interested persons, to encourage those who cannot be joined to 
intervene, and to discourage those who might obstruct joinder from doing so. Semmel, supra 
note 1, at 1471-79. He proposes that a party should be precluded only ifhe could have joined 
the nonparties who seek to invoke the prior judgment, and that a nonparty should not be able 
to assert a prior judgment if he could have consolidated or become a party to the prior suit. 
Since the plaintiff will be bound as to any defendants he could have joined, he has every 
incentive to join them; only by doing so can he derive the maximum advantage from a 
favorable judgment. What Semmel advocates is a weak form of compulsory joinder. Al-
though the common party is barred by defeat, unasserted claims are not merged in a favorable 
judgment. 
The Restatement lists as one of the factors to be considered in determining the propriety of 
preclusion absent mutuality whether "[t]he person seeking to invoke favorable preclusion, or 
to avoid unfavorable preclusion, could have affected joinder in the first action between himself 
and his present adversary." REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS app. § 88(3) (Tent. 
Draft No. 3, 1976). The Restatement cites Semmel as support, although it recognizes the 
possibility that a party may be precluded despite the fact that he could not have effected join-
der. Id., Comment 3 (citing United States v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. 
Wash., D. Nev. 1962), affd. sub nom. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), 
cert. dismissed, 319 U.S. 951 (1964), discussed in text at note 66 supra). 
McCoid anticipates the day when the threat that a defendant will be estopped to defend in 
future litigation will be deemed a sufficient basis for a fmding that all plaintiffs are necessary 
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nor's lament that "it is difficult to comprehend . U]ust why a 
party who was not bound by a previous action should be precluded 
from asserting it as res judicata."124 They should instead attempt 
accurately to balance the competing interests in judicial economy 
and the equitable distribution of litigation risks. 
Ill. EXCEPTIONS TO MUTUALITY 
A. The Risk A/location Function of Preclusion 
Although the cases discussed thus far have involved multiple par-
ties with related claims, the claims themselves have been essentially 
bilateral-each claim has been assumed to involve only one plaintiff 
and one defendant. It was demonstrated that the abandonment of 
mutuality in these multiparty bilateral cases causes an inequitable 
distribution of litigation risks. A determination whether mutuality 
should be required becomes more complex in multilateral cases in 
which more than one defendant may be liable for a single injury or 
in which more than one plaintiff asserts a single claim. Typical of 
multilateral cases involving more than one defendant are joint liabil-
ity, joint and several liability, and derivative liability cases. These 
multilateral, multiple defendant cases share several common fea-
tures: more than one defendant exists from whom the plaintiff may 
collect a single obligation; payment by one of the defendants gener-
ally discharges the liability of the other defendruJ,ts to the plaintiff;125 
and the defendant against whom the plaintiff obtains a judgment 
parties. McCoid, supra note 122 at 724. An examination of existing compulsory joinder 
rules, however, yields litµe language which can be so construed. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 19: 
A person ... shall be joined ... if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded 
among those already parties, or (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the 
action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a 
practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the 
P'.rsons already parties subject to a substantial nsk of incurring double, multiple, or other-
wise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest. 
Under this rule, compulsory joinder is not mandated in the typical common party situations. 
Relief can be accorded among the parties despite the absence of a nonparty claimant, and the 
ability of the nonparty claimants to protect their interests is not impeded by the suit, at least in 
a case like United, where the fund from which damages will be paid is practically unlimited. 
Finally, none of those already parties run the risk of multiple or inconsistent obligations that 
could be eliminated by the joinder of additional claimants. To the contrary, under Bernhard 
the common party's objection is that the chance of inconsistent judgments has been eliminated. 
124. Bernhard v. Bank of America Natl. Sav. & Trust Assn., 19 Cal. 2d 807, 812, 122 P.2d 
892, 895 (1942); see note 9 supra. 
125. REsrATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 95 (1942). The Second Restatement provides that 
the liability of other defendants is discharged only to the extent of the payment made. RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS§ 95(2) (fent. Draft No. 3, 1976). Thus, if the plaintiff 
can recover a large judgment against one defendant, payment of a smaller judgment will not 
relieve a second defendant of liability for the excess. However, in most instances, the new 
§ 88, see id. app. § 88, would preclude relitigation of the amount of damages. Id. § 95, Com-
ment d. 
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generally becomes subrogated to the rights of the plaintiff with re-
spect to the remaining defendants, 126 limited only by the extent of 
his own liability to the plaintiff and by any equitable defenses or 
personal immunities that the other defendants can raise. 127 
Many of the traditional exceptions to the requirements of mutu-
ality have arisen in the context of multilateral litigation. 128 Given 
the inability of the commentators and the courts properly to identify 
the underlying basis for mutuality in the relatively simple multiparty 
bilateral context, their disagreement as to the application of mutual-
ity in the multilateral context is unsurprising. The proper analysis 
in such cases129 can be illustrated by an examination of the multilat-
eral multiparty situation presented by the principle of respondeat su-
perior and the other doctrines of derivative liability which give rise 
to the most frequent exception to the mutuality requirement (apart 
from the complete abandonment contemplated by Bemhard). 130 
Courts generally hold that a judgment in favor of the primary 
def endant/indemnitor can be invoked by the derivative defendant/ 
indemnitee131 to preclude the plaintiff, even though the principal, if 
not a party to the suit against his agent, could not have been bound 
had the judgment gone the other way.132 The justification for this 
exception to mutuality is uniformly approved; without preclusion ei-
126. See Pennwall Corp. v. Metropolitan Sanitary Dist, 368 F. Supp. 927 (N.D. Ill. 1973). 
127. Not only is the subrogee subject to any defenses which could have been raised against 
the subrogor, but he is subject to a variety of defenses personal to him that could not have been 
raised against the original plaintiff through whom he claims. See REsTATEMENT OF REsTI-
TUTION §§ 81-85 (1937). To the extent that the co=on law denies contribution between joint 
tortfeasors, see id. § 102, it is essentially on these grounds. The tortfeasor is barred by the 
doctrine of "unclean hands," a defense that the other tortfeasor could not have raised against 
the plaintiff. See National Fire Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 281 U.S. 331 (1930). Many states, 
however, now have a co=on law or statutorily created right to contribution among joint 
tortfeasors. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 886A, Note (Tent. Draft No. 16, 1970). 
128. See Moore & Currier, supra note 1, at 311-26. Other situations for which there are 
exceptions to mutuality include cases in which there has been secret participation in litigation 
by a nonparty, cases in which a prior criniinal judgment is given conclusive effect in a subse-
quent civil trial, see note 1 supra, and cases involving privity of estate between predecessor 
and successor. Moore & Currier, supra note I, at 327-29. 
129. The principles developed in this subsection are equally applicable to the various per-
mutations of derivative and joint liability, although the precise rule that is appropriate will 
vary with the theory of liability. 
130. See Moore & Currier, supra note 1, at 311, 322-24. 
131. The typical respondeat superior claim arises out of the employment relationship, in 
which case the agent/employee is the primary defendant and the principal/employer is the 
derivative defendant 
132. REsTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 96 (1942). See Brobston v. Darby Borough, 290 Pa. 
331, 138 A. 849 (19,27). Cf. Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 
U.S. Ill (1912) (nonparty joint tortfeasor not bound· by judgment adverse to his fellow 
tortfeasor); United States v. Allsbury, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 186 (1866) (surety liability limited to 
amount of judgment against principal debtor). 
666 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 76:612 
ther the indemnitor or the indemnitee would suffer inconsistent lia-
bility if the plaintiff were to prevail in the second suit. 133 When, 
however, the derivative defendant is sued first, or when there is no 
right to indemnity, the authorities disagree with respect to whether 
preclusion of the plaintiff should be allowed absent mutuality. Be-
cause either the primary or the derivative defendant may be sued 
first, and because the derivative defendant may or may not have a 
right of indemnity against the primary defendant, the principle of 










(S) Sued First 
Category 2 
Category 4 
The First Restatement of Judgments allowed preclusion only in cate-
gories I and 3.134 Category 1 represents the typical situation in 
which preclusion is allowed in order to avoid the possibility of in-
consistent liability.135 The rationale for an exception in category 3 is 
133. If a judgment against the claimant [in an action against the indemnitor] were not 
res judicata in a subsequent action against the indemnitee, either the indemnitee would be 
required to pay without the possibility of indemnity against the indemnitor, or the indem• 
niter would be required to make indemnity for a claim which, in an action by the claim• 
ant against him, had been found not to exist. 
REsTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS,§ 96, Comment a (1942). See also id.§ 97 (derivative liability 
in contract). The revisers for the Second Restatement, adopting the Bernhard rationale, 
maintain that the primary basis for the § 96 exception and cases in accord with it was the 
injustice of permitting one who had had his day in court to reopen identical issues by substitut-
ing a new adversary. Reporter's Note to REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 99, Com-
ments a & b (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1976). 
While it is not clear whether it is the indemnitor or the indemnitee who would suffer incon• 
sistent liability by the application of the mutuality doctrine in this situation, see id. § 99, Com• 
ment b, the question has been mooted by the universal acceptance of this exception to 
mutuality. 
134. With respect to categories I and 3, the Restatement rule is that 
[A] valid judgment on the merits and not based on a personal defense, in favor of a person 
charged with the commission of a tort or a breach of contract, bars a subsequent action by 
the plaintiff against another responsible for the conduct of such person if the action 1s 
based solely upon the existence of a tort or breach of contract by such person, whether or 
not the other person has a right of indemnity. 
REsTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 99 (1942). For the proposition that there should be no pre• 
clusion in categories 2 and 4, see RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS §§ 96(2) & Comments j & k, 
99 (1942). 
135. See note 133 supra and accompanying text. 
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not as satisfactory, 136 particularly since category 3, along with cate-
gories 2 and 4, does not present the possibility of inconsistent liabil-
ity.131 
In contrast to the First Restatement, the Second Restatement and 
the major commentators allow preclusion in all four categories.138 
However, the commentators disagree as to whether allowing preclu-
sion in categories 2, 3, and 4 is consistent with the mutuality doc-
trine. Currie argues that preclusion in these cases is necessary but 
that it is inconsistent with the principles underlying mutuality. 
Thus, to Currie, these "exceptions" are precedent for the general 
abandonment of mutuality.139 Moore and Currier accept the appro-
priateness of preclusion in these three categories, but they disagree 
136. Currie has been particularly critical of the Restatement's application of preclusion to 
category 3 and yet not to categories 2 and 4: 
I have always been suspicious of this rule. As the Restatement acknowledges, it has nar-
row scope, because most of the cases of derivative liability involve a right to indemnity. 
In the rare cases that are left, no relaxation of the mutuality rule is dictated by the neces-
sity of avoiding a situation of actual injustice such as that involved in the indemnity cases. 
Within its limited effective sphere, the rule seems motivated by the intuitive notion that 
the jud~ent in favor of the actor "destroys the basis" for the liability; but this is naive. 
One mtght as well sal that the first fmding of negligence against our railroad destroys the 
basis for the railroads defense .... If the actor IS exonerated and the person derivatively 
liable is made to pay, there is no injustice such as is produced where the indemnity rela-
tion exists; there IS only an inconsistency which is readily explained by the limitations of 
the adjudication process. The Restatement gives only one sound reason why the plaintiff 
should be barred in this situation: he has had his day in court, and it is not unfair to deny 
him a second chance against another adversary. But that is the rule of the Bernhard case. 
There is no reason to confme it to the derivative liability situation and the Restatement 
should logically adopt the Bernhard doctrine. 
Currie, 9 STAN. L. R.Ev. 281, supra note 3, at 314. AccordREsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDG-
MENTS § 99, Comment b (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1976). 
The First Restatement is not completely inconsistent. In favor of the Restatement rule, it 
might be argued that it is fair to deny a second opportunity where, because of the plaintiff's 
initial loss, the derivative defendant will be especially likely to be forced to bear the loss. If 
the primary defendant is held liable in addition to the derivative defendant, there is at least the 
possibility that the plaintiff will elect and will be able to levy on the primary defendant for all 
or part of the judgment. Once the primary defendant has won his case, that option is fore-
closed. 
137. In contrast to category I (in which the agent/indemnitor is sued first and exonerated), 
see note 133 supra, there is no risk of inconsistent liability in category 2. Even if the 
agent/indemnitor is subsequently held liable, the judgment on behalf of the principal is only 
logically inconsistent. It frustrates no right of indemnity because the agent is the one ulti-
mately liable. Nor is there any possibility of a second attack by another party against the 
agent/indemnitor if he prevails over the plaintiff (the plaintiff having already lost to the prin-
cipal/indemnitee). _ 
While in category 2 the possibility of inconsistent liability created by the indemnity rela-
tionship should be disregarded once a judgment has been rendered on behalf of the indemni-
tee, in categories 3 and 4 the problem never arises, because the derivative party has no recourse 
in any event. 
138. See ~TATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS§ 99 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1976); Currie, 
9 STAN. L. R.Ev. 281, supra note 3, at 314-15; Moore & Currier, supra note I, at 3ll-16. 
139. See Currie, 9 STAN. L. REv. 281, supra note 3, at 314-15. Accord REsTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS§ 99, Comment b (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1976) ("In historical perspec-
tive, the rule is chiefly explained as an early emerging exception to the mutuality rule.") 
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with Currie that these exceptions are inconsistent with mutuality. 
They maintain that these cases involve a legal relationship between 
the derivative and primary defendants that distinguishes them from 
other multiple party litigation in which mutuality traditionally oper-
ates.140 
As will be demonstrated in subsection B, preclusion should be 
allowed in each of the four categories and, as Moore and Currier 
maintain, these exceptions are not inconsistent with mutuality. The 
grounds for these conclusions can best be understood by considering 
the allocation of litigation risks that occur in derivative liability 
cases.141 
Although rules of preclusion ultimately distribute losses, the 
commentators and the courts have failed to perceive that such rules 
initially distribute the risk of loss.142 Absent multiple or inconsis-
tent liability, no outcome is per se anomalous.143 Nonetheless, it is 
unsatisfactory to avoid only the potential for an anomalous outcome 
that arises if the plaintiff is not precluded in type 1 cases, for the risk 
of a particular outcome can unfairly burden a litigant even though 
the outcome itself is wholly unobjectionable. This simple observa-
tion makes possible the statement of a single principle that subsumes 
both the mutuality doctrine and its exceptions: Rules of preclusion 
should be fashioned so that every litigant's a priori risk of failure, with-
out reference to the merits, is no more than 50%. The a priori risk of 
140. Moore & Currier, supra note 1, at 311-16. 
Currie would find Moore and Currier's attempt to reconcile the mutuality doctrine with 
preclusion in categories 2 and 4 unpersuasive. If he were inclined to accept mutuality, Currie 
would prefer the First Restatement approach: 
From the point of view of an adherent to the mutuality rule . . . no necessity exists for 
allowing an indemnitor to plead a judgment favorable to the indemnitee ...• The judg-
ment in favor of the indemnitee disposes of any problem relating to the indemnity rela-
tion, and no necessity requires relaxation of the mutuality rule. • . . The [First) 
Restatement is much more 1ogical (given its basic adherence to the mutuality rule): it 
would not permit "the indemnitor" to plead the judgment favorable to the indeinnitee. 
Currie, 9 STAN. L. REv. 281, supra note 3, at 307 nn. 61 & 62. Accord RESTATEMENT OF 
JUDGMENTS § 96, Comment j (1942); Semmel, supra note 1, at 1463. 
141. The ultimate justification for preclusion in all four cases is that the plaintiff is entitled 
to only one recovery·and has no legitimate claim to a reduction of his normal litigation risks at 
the expense of the defendants. The legal relationship of the defendants is relevant because it 
is critical to the theory of liability. It is not the "closeness" of the defendants that makes it 
legitimate for one to invoke the judgment in favor of the other, as Moore and Currier seem to 
imply, supra note 1 at 311-21. 
142. But see note 120 supra. 
143. By "outcome" is meant the entire disposition of the case. Holding the secondary 
defendant liable while exonerating the alleged tortfeasor is one outcome anomalous by itself 
where there is a right to indemnity. The converse, i.e., holding the primary party liable while 
exonerating the secondary party, while not objectionable per se, may place an unfair burden 
on the primary defendant if there is an unfair risk that it will occur. 
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failure should be no less than 50% unless, solely because of his trial 
posture and the theory of liability, a lighter burden is equitable. 
The notion that a litigant's a priori risk of failure should not ex-
ceed 50% is simply a mathematical expression of the rules governing 
the burden of persuasion in civil litigation. As shown earlier, in the 
multiparty bilateral case the mutuality doctrine is essential if the 
common party's a priori risk is not to exceed 50%.144 In the bilateral 
situation the rule that neither litigant's risk should exceed 50% im-
plies that both parties face a priori risks of exactly 50%. Where, 
however, litigation is multilateral, as in derivative liability cases, not 
every litigant can bear a 50% risk because the total risk cannot ex-
ceed 100%. Thus, in multilateral cases the focus shifts from the con-
cern that no party bear a risk in excess of 50% to the concern that the 
reduction in average risk that accompanies the presence of more 
than two parties be properly distributed. 
Since rules of preclusion operate without reference to the merits 
and are established in advance of trial, risks must be allocated solely 
by reference to the theory of liability and to the roles of the litigants 
with respect to that theory. 145 
B. Probabilistic Analysis of the Exceptions to Mutuality 
By examining the four derivative liability cases represented in 
Figure 1, this subsection will illustrate the role that the theory of 
liability should play in determining when preclusion should be al-
lowed in multilateral litigation absent mutuality. Thi~ examination 
will establish three points with respect to derivative liability cases. 
First, cases in categories 1 and 3 (in which the derivative defendant 
seeks to invoke a judgment rendered on behalf of the primary de-
fendant), cannot reasonably be distinguished from cases in catego-
ries.2 and 4 (in which the primary defendant seeks to preclude the 
plaintiff on the basis of a prior judgment favoring the derivative de-
fendant). Second, to the extent that any distinctions can be drawn 
among thefour categories of derivative liability cases, the proper dis-
tinction is between indemnity cases and non-indemnity cases, a dis-
144. See Table I supra. Note that the "events" listed in the table correspond to single 
trials, for example, recovery from the fifth defendant. Tables A and B, note 87 supra, in 
contrast, list composite events such as the probability that plaintiff will recover from five de-
fendants. Table I thus illustrates the increase in the common party's risk with respect to indi-
vidual opponents in the multiparty bilateral case. 
145. But cf. note 118 supra, which suggests that where mutuality has been rejected, many 
courts employ the full and fair opportunity rubric to impose their own judgments of the merits 
of a case. This is an allocation of a different kind. It is, in effect, a judicial "compromise 
verdict." The measure of relief is made to vary, not according to the nature of the injury, but 
according to the degree of subjective certainty about the result 
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.tinction drawn by none of the commentators.146 Finally, in all four 
types of cases exceptions to the mutuality doctrine are appropriate 
and consistent with the principles underlying mutuality. Thus, they 
provide no precedent for Bernhard. 
1. Categories 1 and 2· Right of {ndemnity 
This Note next analyzes in probabilistic terms the propriety of 
granting an exception to mutuality in derivative liability cases in 
which the derivative defendant may indemnify any losses against the 
primary defendant. Assume, for the sake of simplicity and to isolate 
the effects of preclusion, that the case is a 50% case on its merits. In 
addition, assume that the probability of success or failure on the is-
sue of liability is the same whether the issue is raised by the plaintiff 
against one of the defendants or by the derivative defendant in an 
indemnity action against the primary defendant. 147 As a practical 
matter, in respondeat superior cases the employer/ derivative defend-
ant will often be the ultimate source of the plaintiffs recovery, since 
employees seldom possess assets sufficient to compensate either the 
plaintiff or the employer seeking indemnification. However, as long 
as the derivative defendant has a right of indemnity, the judicial sys-
tem cannot ignore the possibility of inconsistent liability. 
That the derivative defendant has a right of indemnity indicates 
that the purpose of derivative liability is only to provide a deeper 
pocket from which the plaintiff can obtain compensation, not to pro-
vide a "collateral source" of expected recovery.148 The derivative 
defendant is there only to assume the risk that the primary defendant 
is financially irresponsible, not to assume the risk of personal liabil-
ity without being able to obtain a judgment for indemnity. Thus, 
provided the derivative defendant is not held liable without recourse 
against the primary defendant, the derivative defendant will be 
deemed not to have suffered a loss. On the basis of these observa-
146. See text at note 134-40 supra. 
147. In reality, the probability of success will sometimes be less for the derivative defend• 
ant in a suit against the primary defendant than for the plaintiff pursuing the primary defend• 
ant, since the primary defendant may possess defenses against the derivative defendant that 
are unavailable against the plaintiff. 
148. "Collateral source" is used here in a peculiar sense. Ordinarily it refers to a source of 
recovery that does not discharge the debt of the defendant. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OP 
JUDGMENTS § 95, Comment e (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1976). That is not the rule in derivative 
liability cases, since any payment received by the plaintiff discharges all defendants to the 
extent of the payment. See id. § 95. However, where the additional defendant does lessen or 
eliminate the litigation risk of the plaintiff, he is an additional "source" of expected or average 
recovery. 
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tions, the most desirable distribution of risks in derivative liability 
cases in which the derivative defendant has a right of indemnity is: 
risk of loss for plaintiff (P) .5 
risk of loss for primary defendant (.D) = .5 
risk of loss for derivative (secondary) defendant (S) = 0 
Ideally, to be consistent with the theory of derivative liability, the risk of 
ultimate liability should be distributed as though the case were strictly 
bilateral. This ideal risk distribution for cases in categories 1 and 2 
can be compared with the actual distribution of risks under both mu-
tuality and an exception to mutuality. The attainable distributions 
are tabulated in Table IV,149 using the abbreviations P, .D, and S for 
plaintiff, primary defendant, and derivative (secondary) defendant, 
respectively. The indeterminate case in which P defeats both .D and 
S but S loses the suit for indemnity is represented by I. The distri-
149. A discussion of the assumptions underlying Table IV and the method used to calcu-
late the risk distributions appears in Appendix B. 
In addition to the distributions appearing in the table, two other distributions are attainable 
under a quasi-exception to mutuality. This quasi-exception occurs in category 2 (S sued first) 
when a judgment rendered against P in a subsequent suit against JJ relieves S of a prior 
judgment against him. This is in effect a mutuality exception, albeit one that operates only in 
favor of S. The effect of this one-way exception is to make the risk distribution contingent on 
P's decisions. Since P risks the loss of a favorable judgment rendered against S, he will not 
proceed against JJ unless he must. Thus, if S can satisfy all or most of the judgment, the 
distribution is still that of column E. The quasi-exception only limits P if he first defeats S , 
and then only if he elects to pursue JJ. Assuming no preclusion, if he loses to She still has 
another opportunity to litigate the same claim. The risks borne by each party under this 
quasi-exception are calculated as follows (the notation PIS means P loses to S; PwS means p 
wins against S; etc.): 
P's risk of loss: 
PIS• PIJJ 










This quasi-exception can also operate when preclusion is allowed, that is, when an exception to 
mutuality is already recognized. Although P is precluded by an initial loss to S, a favorable 
judgment can still be set aside if P sues .lJ for the residue and loses. In effect, the judgment 
for JJ constitutes "payment" of the amount for which he is at risk. The resultant risks are as 
follows: 
P's risk of loss: 
PIS = .5 
PwS • PIJJ = .25 
.75 
JJ's risk of loss (assuming subrogation): 
PwS • PwJJ = .25 
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bution of the loss thus depends on how P collects on the two judg-
ments. The columns represent the various risk distributions that 
result under different assumptions about the availability of subroga-
tion and impleader and about whether the primary defendant can 
prevent an indemnity action by the derivative defendant. For ex-
ample, the risk distribution in column A occurs when S can main-
tain an indemnity action against .D even though .D has successfully 
defended a direct action by P, but S cannot subrogate an indemnity 
claim to a verdict for P against .D and cannot implead or vouch in .D 
when defending an action by P. The assumptions that underly the 
other columns are described in Appendix B. 
Note that without preclusion P's risk of loss is .25. All of the 
variations serve only to alter the distribution of risk between .D and 
S. With preclusion, a risk of .25 is shifted from D to P. 
p loses 
Case! D loses 
(D sued fu:st) S loses 
I 
ploscs 
Case2 D loses 
(S sued fu:st) Sloscs 
I 
No PRECLUSION 
(No mutuality exception) 
(A) (B) (C) (D) 
.25 .25 .25 .25 
.375 .5 .5 .625 
.25 .25 .125 .125 
.125 - .125 -
.25 .25 .25 .25 
.375 .s .s .625 
.25 .25 .125 .125 







.15 .125 - .25 - .125 
PRECLUSION 
(Mutuality Exception) 





.5 .5 .5 
.25 .25 .375 







What is striking about Table IV is that the attainable distribu-
tions of risk absent an exception to mutuality are identical whether 
.D is sued first or S is sued first. Thus, in terms of risk allocation, 
there is no basis for permitting an exception to mutuality in the for-
mer case but not in the latter. 
The commentators have focused on the ultimate outcome rather 
than on the risk distribution and thus have designed rules that avoid 
only outcomes that cause a single party to bear inconsistent liability. 
But permitting P to sue D after losing to S still affords him two bites 
at the apple. Since P has only a single claim, the second opportunity 
to litigate necessarily decreases his overall risk of loss. Conse-
quently, either .D or S ( or perhaps both) must bear a heavier burden. 
The presence of a third party, the derivative defendant, can reliev~ 
one or the other of the primary litigants of all or part of his share of 
the risk. But with respect to the plaintiff, the two defendants are not 
unlike a single entity. D and S have a consensual relationship that 
requires S to guarantee certain obligations incurred by D. Presum-
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ably, some reciprocal benefit has induced S to enter the relationship 
and assume that burden. How the loss is distributed between them 
should be of no concern to P. He should not be the beneficiary of a 
windfall reduction in litigation risk. Thus, if S is to share and 
thereby reduce anyone's risk of loss, it should be .D's.150 
This is precisely the result when, as it should be for cases in both 
categories 1 and 2, preclusion is allowed. The distribution of risks 
under an exception to mutuality properly reflects the assumption 
that the derivative defendant is only meant to assume the risk of the 
primary defendant's financial irresponsibility. Distribution (K), the 
ideal distribution, is obtained when preclusion is allowed and the 
derivative defendant can implead the primary defendant or can sub-
rogate an indemnity claim to a verdict for plaintiff against the pri-
mary defendant. 151 Even when circumstances are such that the 
derivative defendant cannot be held harmless (as is the case for dis-
tributions (F) through (J)), at least it is the primary defendant, rather 
than the plaintiff, who is the beneficiary of the risk borne by the 
derivative defendant. 
2. Categories 3 and 4: No Right of Indemnity 
The effect of preclusion in derivative liability cases in which no 
indemnification right exists is illustrated in Table V, 152 which tabu-
150. In terms of the accuracy of the trial product, the error roioiroiziog strategy requires 
that the plaintiff be granted judgment only when it is more likely than not that the primary 
defendant was culpable. Where the unavoidable risk of error burdens the secondary defend-
ant it would be inconsistent with the theory of secondary liability for that risk to benefit the 
plaintiff. 
151. The statement in the text is a bit sweeping. The statement is correct when JJ is sued 
first. But when S is sued first, distribution (K) results only when preclusion is allowed and S 
can implead JJ. See Appendix B. 
152. Determining the distribution of risks absent indemnity is comparatively simple. In 
category 3, column (A), the distribution is as follows: 
P's risk of loss: 
.PID • .PIS = .25 
D's risk of loss: 
.PwD • .PIS = .25 
S's risk of loss: 
.PID • .PwS = .25 
I: 
.PwD • .PwS = .25 
Column (D) reflects the case under the mutuality exception in which .P is pi:ecluded by a 
Joss toJJ. 
.P's risk of loss: 
J'ID = .5 
.PD's risk of loss: 
.PwJJ • .PIS = .25 
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lates the attainable distributions of risks for cases in categories 3 and 
4 under the same assumptions made with respect to Table IV. 
The number of attainable risk distributions in these cases is much 
smaller than in cases in which the derivative defendant has a right of 
indemnity. In the only attainable distribution under mutuality 
I: 
PwD • PwS = .25. 
In the pure mutuality case, when Sis sued first, the distribution of risks is, again, the same as 
when D is sued first. It is derived in the same manner as above. The distribution is shown in 
category 4, column (A). 
Column (B), however, incorporates the quasi-exception to mutuality discussed in relation 
to category 2, note 151 supra. That quasi-exception permits a subsequent loss by P to D to 
relieve S of an adverse judgment rendered against him in the first suit. The distribution is 
computed as follows: 
P's risk of loss: 
PIS• PID = .25 
+PwS • PID = .25 
.5 
D's risk of loss: 
PIS• PwD == .25 
I: 
PwS• PwD .25 
Column (C) is simply the mutuality exception. A loss in the first suit precludes any further 
action by P. A victory by Pin the first suit either causes S (the indemnitee) to bear the entire 
loss if D prevails in the second suit or results in the indeterminate case if D loses. (But 
compare the distribution in category 3, column (D), in which D bears the entire loss if P fails 
to prevail in the second suit. See text preceeding note 156 infra.) 
P's risk of loss: 
PIS = .5 
S's risk of loss: 
PwS • PID = .25 
I: 
PwS • PwD = .25 
Finally, column (E) reflects the combination of the mutuality exception with the quasi-excep• 
tion. Pis precluded by a loss in the first suit and loses the benefit of a favorable verdict in the 
first suit if he elects to proceed against D and loses. (Such a case logically assumes S has 
insufficient assets.) 
P's risk of loss is then: 
PIS .5 
+PwS•PID == .25 
:75 
I: 
PwS• PwD .25 
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Mutuality Mutuality Exception 
(no preclusion) (preclusion) 
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) 
P's risk of loss .25 .5 
Category 3 D's risk ofloss .25 .25 
(D sued first) S's risk of loss .25 0 
I .25 .25 
P's risk of loss .25 .5 .5 .75 
Category 4 D's risk of loss .25 .25 0 0 
(S sued first) S's risk of loss .25 0 .25 0 
l .25 .25 .25 .25 
TABLE V 
(other than (B), a quasi-exception to mutuality)153 the plaintiffs risk 
of loss is reduced from 50% to 25% by the presence of the derivative 
defendant. As was the case with respect to categories 1 and 2, under 
mutuality the plaintiff has two opportunities to win the same 
claim-once against the primary defendant and once against the de-
rivative defendant. 
The Restatement favors an exception to mutuality in category 3 
but not in category 4. 154 The commentators, on the other hand, 
agree that these two cases cannot be distinguished, but disagree on 
whether a mutuality exception is consistent with the policies under-
lying mutuality.155 Table V demonstrates that when no right of in-
demnity exists, no distinction can be made under mutuality on the 
basis of which defendant is sued first. When an exception to mutu-
ality is permitted, a distinction based on the order of suit does arise. 
This distinction is attributable to the fact that only the defendant 
sued first can be held solely liable while the other is either entirely 
exonerated or liable only as part of the indeterminate outcome. 
That the derivative defendant has no right of indemnity suggests 
there is no overriding policy in favor of compelling the primary de-
fendant to bear the loss rather than the derivative defendant. Thus 
distributions (C) and (D) are equally acceptable, and no reason ex-
ists to distinguish between categories 3 and 4, with or without an 
exception to mutuality. ts6 
153. See note 152 supra. 
154. See REsTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS §§ 96(2), 99 & § 96 Co=ents j & k (1942), dis-
cussed in note 134 supra. 
155. See notes 139 & 140 supra. 
156. A rule could be devised like the one suggested in the indemnity cases-the quasi-
exception represented by column (E). P could be deprived of his judgment against S to the 
extent that he lias put D at risk and lost. However, the justification for the refinement in the 
indemnity cases was to avoid subjecting one or the other of the defendants to inconsistent 
liability, even though their aggregate risk is only .5. Here, absent indemnity, there can be no 
inconsistent liability because neither defendant can be subjected to more than one lawsuit. 
676 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 76:612 
A comparison of Tables IV and V suggests that if any distinction 
is to be drawn among the four categories of cases, it should be based 
upon whether or not the derivative defendant has a right of indem-
nity. Nonetheless, for much the same reason as was suggested in the 
indemnity cases, preclusion should also be permitted in the non-in-
demnity cases. The absence of a right of indemnity only affects the 
distribution of loss between the primary defendant and the deriva-
tive defendant; it is of no concern to the plaintiff. There is no reason 
why the primary defendant and the derivative defendant, considered 
together, should incur a litigation risk greater than 50%, as they do 
under mutuality.157 If the derivative defendant cannot avoid bear-
ing some risk of loss, the theory of derivative liability suggests that 
that risk should redound to the benefit of the primary defendant 
rather than to the plaintiff. Thus, the appropriate result in catego-
ries 3 and 4, as in categories I and 2, is to permit an exception to 
mutuality and to allow preclusion of the plaintiff. 
IV. APPLICATION OF PRECLUSION PRINCIPLES: 
PENNINGTON V. SNOW 
The preceding sections of this Note established, through the use 
of probability theory, that in multiparty bilateral litigation the mutu-
ality requirement is necessary to assure that the relative risks of the 
parties are consistent with the burden of persuasion in civil litiga-
tion. It was then demonstrated that whether or not preclusion 
should be allowed in the context of multilateral litigation depends 
upon the theory of liability underlying the relationship between the 
parties. In particular, it was shown that preclusion should be per-
mitted in derivative liability cases whether the primary or the deriva-
tive defendant is sued first and whether or not the derivative 
defendant has a right of indemnity. The inequities that can result 
when the courts respond to a plea of collateral estoppel without ade-
quately considering the policies expressed in the mutuality doctrine 
are illustrated by a recent decision of the Alaska Supreme Court pur-
porting to adopt the Bernhard rule. 
In Pennington v. Snow, 158 Mr. Pennington first sued his insurance 
company to recover medical expenses incurred by his wife. He al-
leged that Mrs. Pennington's spontaneous abortion of the fetus she 
was carrying was caused by a low-speed collision between the Pen-
157. While the risk ofloss in the indeterminate case is not clearly O's or Ss, it is borne by 
one of them, not by P. 
158. 471 P.2d 370 (Alaska 1970). 
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nington vehicle and a car driven by Snow. The insurer prevailed.in 
this initial suit, since Pennington failed to establish that the acci-
dent caused the miscarriage. Mrs. Pennington subsequently brought 
suit for damages against Snow, alleging the same injuries. Snow 
pleaded the judgment for Pennington's insurance company as a de-
fense.159 
On review of the trial court's rejection of the collateral estoppel 
plea, the Alaska Supreme Court purported to adopt .Bernhard.160 
Mrs. Pennington was not a named party in the prior suit, but the 
court held that she was in privity with her husband and bound by the 
earlier judgment to the same extent that he would have been.161 Af-
ter deciding that .Bernhard was applicable to Mrs. Pennington's suit 
against Snow, the court considered whether the full and fair oppor-
tunity requirement had been satisfied.162 Observing that the prior 
claim had been for a comparatively small amount and that the case 
had therefore been decided in a court of limited jurisdiction, the 
court held that Mrs. Pennington was not estopped to litigate the issue 
of causation in her suit against Snow. 163 
The situation of the insurance company in Pennington is similar 
in some respects to that of the derivative defendant in the derivative 
liability cases discussed earlier.164 Had the company paid Mr. Pen-
nington's claim, either upon request or because of a judgment for 
Pennington, it presumably would have been subrogated to the Pen-
ningtons' claims against Snow. Since the insurance company is the 
additional party to the bilateral dispute, any risk of ultimate liability 
borne by it must lessen the risk borne by either Pennington or Snow 
( or perhaps both). Assuming the court had found the full and fair 
opportunity test satisfied, the decision to app~y .Bernhard, and thus to 
preclude relitigation of the causation issue, would have given Snow 
the benefit of the company's presence. Allowing Snow to preclude 
Pennington from relitigating following Pennington's loss to the in-
surance company leaves Snow with only a 25% chance of being held 
liable (assuming Pennington has a 50% case). Snow has two oppor-
159. 471 P.2d at 373. 
160. 471 P.2d at 377. The court alluded to Currie's two suggested limitations of Bernhard, 
471 P.2d at 377 n.14, citing Currie, 9 STAN. L. REV. 281, supra note 3; but, fmding neither of 
them applicable, declined to accept or reject them. 
161. 471 P.2d at 374-76. 
162. "Thus, while we hold that mutuality will not be required as a rule, it remains to be 
inquired, in each case, whether there were any unusual or· exceptional factors in the prior 
adjudication which would warrant the application of the mutuality requirement." 471 P.2d at 
377. 
163. 471 P.2d at 377-79. 
164. See text at notes 148-50 supra. 
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tunities to defeat Pennington: Snow wins if the insurance company 
wins, and Snow wins if the company loses but he personally prevails 
in the company's subrogation action. Pennington has only one op-
portuajty to litigate and therefore bears a 50% risk of loss. The com-
pany bears tlie remaining 25% risk, which represents the chance that 
it will be found liable to Pennington ~der the insurance contract yet 
fail to prove Pennington's claim in its subsequent suit against Snow. 
The result dictated by the court's adoption of Bernhard is incon-
sistent with the actual relationship between the parties and with the 
theory of liability underlying that relationship. What distinguishes 
Pennington from the derivative liability cases is that in Pennington 
the third party and the plaintiff shared a contractual relationship, 
not the third party and the primary defendant. Pennington paid the 
insurance company for the right to recover his losses. By doing so 
he purchased an additional defendant.165 If anyone ought to benefit 
from the risk assumed by the company it must be Pennington, who 
paid premiums that reflect precisely that risk. Thus Pennington 
should not be precluded from litigating the issue of causation against 
Snow despite his loss to the insurance company. 
The correct distribution of risks leaves Pennington with a 25% 
risk of loss, which arises because Pennington ultimately loses only if 
unsuccessful against both the insurer and against Snow. Snow, on 
the other hand, bears a 50% risk, for he can lose either by losing to 
Pennington after Pennington has lost to the insurer, or by losing to 
the insurance company after Pennington has prevailed against the 
company. Finally, the remaining 25% risk falls upon the insurance 
company, which loses when Pennington is successful against the 
company which is in tum unsuccessful in its subrogation claim 
against Snow.166 
165. Every contract right can be viewed as ultimately nothing more than the purchase of a 
defendant. It cannot therefore be argued that the policyholder is somehow frustrating public 
policy by proliferating defendants. 
166. The risk distributions under preclusion as envisioned by the court in Pennington and 
Preclusion No Preclusion 
(Pennington Suit) (Proper Analysis) 
Pennington's 
P/I = .5 P/I • PIS = ,5 X .5 = .25 risk of loss 
Snow's risk .5 X .5 .25 
PII • PwS = .5 X ,5 = .2s.1 
of loss PwI• IwS = = I= .5 . PwI • IwS = .5 X .5 = .25 
Insurer's risk 
PwI • I/S = .5 X .5 = .25 PwI • IIS = .5 X .5 = .25 of loss 
TABLEE 
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CONCLUSION 
.Bernhard v . .Bank of America National Savings and Trust 
Association stands for the proposition that one who has had a full 
and fair opportunity to litigate an issue and has lost should not be 
permitted to relitigate that issue merely because he has found, or has 
been found by, a new adversary, even though that new opponent 
would not have been bound had the prior judgment gone the other 
way. This Note has examined and rejected .Bernhard's call to aban-
don the mutuality doctrine of collateral estoppel. 
This Note began by demonstrating, with the aid of probability 
theory, that the burden of persuasion in civil litigation embodies a 
strategy designed to minimize the total number of erroneous judg-
ments and that this strategy is based on the various disutilities soci-
ety attaches to the different possible outcomes of litigation. This 
Note then established that the abandonment of mutuality causes a 
statistically certain decrease in the recovery of a party facing multi-
ple opponents on related claims. This effect of .Bernhard is of con-
cern to more than just the common party, for the mutuality doctrine 
is designed to allocate trial risks in a manner consistent with the bur-
den of persuasion, that is, in a manner designed to minimize the total 
number of errors. Thus, the abandonment of mutuality harms the 
system of civil sanctions by weakening the causal link between cul-
pable conduct and trial outcome. This Note also demonstrated that 
the objections to the abandonment of a mutuality requirement are 
not met by a requirement that the common party be precluded only 
if he has previously enjoyed a full and fair opportunity to litigate. 
Both the full and fair opportunity test and the mutuality requirement 
should be satisfied before the common party is precluded. 
Finally, it was demonstrated that the traditional exceptions to the 
mutuality requirement are entirely consistent with an error minimiz-
ing strategy. None of the exceptions is precedent for the abandon-
ment of mutuality except under the same flawed outcome analysis 
that led to the .Bernhard doctrine in the first place. The underlying 
theory of liability that defines the relationship between the parties 
must be the focus when the risk analysis developed in this Note is 
applied to the multilateral litigation cases that give rise to the tradi-
tional mutuality exceptions. 
under the proper application of the requirement of mutuality are summarized in the preceding 
table. (The notation .PII means "Pennington loses to Insurer," .PwS means "Pennington wins 
against Snow," etc.) 
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APPENDIX A 
This Appendix summarizes and criticizes the arguments against 
the abandonment of the mutuality doctrine. 
First, it is argued that the abandonment of mutuality is not neces-
sary in order to prevent multiple harassment, one of the traditional 
objects of collateral estoppel generally. Thus, Moore and Currier 
note that 
X, the stranger, needs no protection against repeated litigation. He 
does not ask to be relieved of litigation for a second time; he asks to be 
relieved of the necessity of litigating at all. Clearly, then, the policy 
protecting individuals from the harassment of repeated lawsuits does 
not require, or even suggest, that X, a stranger to the litigation between 
A and B, should be permitted to use A's judgment against B, either 
affirmatively or negatively.AI 
While there is no need for protection against multiple harassment 
in multiple party cases, there remains the other traditional equity 
ordinarily weighing in favor of collateral estoppel-the interest of 
the state in concluding litigation. The commentators disagree about 
the relative weight to be given these two factors. Greenebaum states 
that while "many dicta can be found stating that res judicata exists 
for public interests, in actual practice precluding litigation for the 
benefit of a party who has no personal claim for protection is novel, 
indeed, revolutionary."A2 On the other hand, von Moschzisker 
points out: 
[O]f the two principles which [res judicata] comprehends, the protec-
tion from the annoyance of repeated litigation, which the individual 
suitor is afforded, is, after all, only an incident of the first principle, 
that the best interests of society demand that litigation be concluded. 
Economy of the time of the courts is one of the obviously beneficial 
results . . . but the broader and even more important aspect of the 
public policy of res judicata is its promotion of peace and quiet in the 
community through the creation of certainty in the relations of men.A3 
There is ample precedent for the assertion that the state's inter-
ests may justify concluding litigation expeditiously despite a possible 
impairment of the interests of the parties.A4 Additionally, the state 
may properly be concerned about the waste of the resources of the 
litigants in repeated litigation whether or not they have previously 
Al. Moore & Currier, supra note 1, at 308. 
A2. Greenebaum, supra note 6, at IO. 
A3. von Moschzisker, supra note 1, at 299-300. See Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. 
University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 328-29 (1971). 
A4. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a) (providing for compulsory counterclaims). 
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been parties.As (It is difficult, however, to take seriously the Court's 
suggestion in Blonder-Tongue that the common party is also a poten-
tial beneficiary of the lack of mutuality since he, too, will be spared 
litigation costs. lfhe is forced to bear additional litigation costs, it is 
only because it is in his interest to do so given the risk of liability-it 
can hardly be to his benefit to be held liable without an opportunity 
to commit admittedly valuable resources to his defense.) 
Thus, this argument against abandonment is merely that some of 
the equities ordinarily favoring preclusion are absent when the party 
raising the estoppel has not previously been a litigant. Those equi-
ties that remain must still be balanced by countervailing considera-
tions, such as equitable risk distribution, if a persuasive case against 
Bernhard is to be made. 
Second, the abandonment of mutuality is said to be inherently 
inconsistent with the principles of in personam jurisdiction. Moore 
and Currier particularly stress the argument that the lack of mutual-
ity would give an in rem aspect to a judgment: 
The theory of an in personam. action is that a plaintiff asserts a claim 
against a named defendant, who is personally subject to the court's 
jurisdiction. . . . 
As a general proposition, the effect of an in personam. judgment 
should extend only to the parties before the court and non-parties who 
bear to parties such a legal relationship, usually termed privity, th~t the 
judgment should both avail and conclude them. The doctrine of mu-
tuality aids in keeping the in personam judgment within such proper 
bounds .... 
To its doctrine of mutuality the common law made certain excep-
tions, which expand the effect of the judgment in keeping with reason 
and experience, without surrendering in personam. principles and with-
out giving the in personam judgment an in rem twist.A6 
This analysis is consistent with their preferred definition of mutual-
ity, ie., that the relevant inquiry is into the identity of the parties 
involved rather than whether they are mutually bound.A7 
ff]he requirement of identity or privity of parties is sufficiently broad 
to relegate the doctrine of mutuality to a relatively insignificant role. 
The functions of limiting the persons entitled to assert the conclu-
sive effect of a judgment in personam. is clearly one of great impor-
tance, and an organic part of the theory of the in personam action.As 
If mutuality is defined as an inherent element of in personam 
jurisdiction, and if it is assumed that the nature of jurisdiction itself 
AS. See Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University oflllinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 
313, 329 (1971). 
A6. Moore & Currier, supra note 1, at 301. See also id. at 310. 
A1. See note 1 supra. 
AS. Moore & Currier, supra note 1, at 330. 
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is somehow sacrosanct, the problem disappears. In defining the 
scope of the preclusive effect to be given a judgment with respect to 
the parties involved, only two meaningful questions can be asked: 
Who is to be benefited and who to be burdened? In rem and in 
personam jurisdiction are merely paradigms. In the classic in per-
sonam case, only those who appear can be bound by the judgment or 
invoke its benefits. The judgment speaks exclusively to the relation-
ship between the persons present. In the pure in rem case, the judg-
ment addresses the relationship between the party present and the 
whole world, present or not. But these paradigms tell us nothing 
about who should or should not be benefited or burdened in a par-
ticular case. Nor are they helpful in deciding whether the burdens 
and benefits should necessarily be coextensive. 
The rules of privity, which Moore and Currier find unobjection-
able, extend the effect of a judgment to persons not actually parties 
and in that sense give an in rem twist to in personam jurisdiction, 
albeit to a fairly limited degree. But the use of the term "privity" is 
a verbal manipulation which merely preserves the integrity of the in 
rem/in personam dichotomy through the fiction that those in privity 
are in some sense within the boundaries of the term "party." Usu-
ally, there are sound policy reasons for doing so. But we should not 
become so enthralled with clever fictions that we forget that they 
look to substantive policies for their vitality.A9 
The Bernhard doctrine gives an in rem aspect to the benefits of a 
judgment without disturbing the in personam nature of the burden. 
To that extent, Moore and Currier are correct. But that hardly an-
swers the fundamental question whether that effect is desirable. 
Third, it is claimed that the abandonment of mutuality may, per-
versely, increase litigation even though the number of trials is de-
creased. 
[l]t is possible that the desirability of conclusiveness of determinations 
is not necessarily compatible with the desirability of minimizing litiga-
tion. Where the doctrine is applied in an individual case, it does oper-
ate both to put an end to litigation of a particular issue and to 
minimize litigation between the parties in the subsequent suit in which 
it is applied. But any tendency to extend the conclusive effects of mat-
ters previously adjudicated might easily tend to intensify the effort ex-
pended in the initial litigation and might increase the probability of 
resort to appeal, particularly where the determination could affect 
causes of action not involved in the current litigation. This would 
seem especially true if the conclusive effect were extended to other ac-
tions not reasonably foreseeable at the time of the initial action.A10 
A9. See Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419, 423 (3d Cir.) (Goodrich, J., concur-
ring), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 865 (1950); REsTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 83, Comment a 
(1942); Vestal, Preclusion/Res Judicata Variables: Parties, SO IOWA L. REV, 27, 44-45 (1964), 
AlO. Polasky, supra note 1, at 220. 
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Polasky's argument is general. It can be addressed to all collat-
eral estoppel cases. Indeed, Polasky did not intend to confine his 
remarks to multiparty cases. Others have deemed the argument 
particularly persuasive in such circumstances.A11 
The first argument, that litigation efforts would be wastefully in-
tensified at the trial level, is misconceived. Because it extends the 
scope of liability, the possibility of collateral estoppel will cause the 
parties to fight harder than they would if the judgment were binding 
only with respect to the present parties, but economies of scale will 
also be achieved. That is, one trial-0f two related "claims" should be 
less costly to both the parties and to the state than would two trials of 
one claim each, unless the efforts of the parties are somehow dispro-
portionate to the liability at stake. 
This first argument also seems to suppose that when future litiga-
tion is unforeseeable (that is, appears highly unlikely) or otherwise 
contingent, the parties will press their claims as vigorously as they 
would if future claims were certain to follow. There is no reason for 
the litigants to so respond, however. A claim that is unlikely to vest 
must, after all, be discounted when estimating the magnitude of the 
liability that turns on the initial verdict. Even if the parties are risk 
averse, so that, for example, a 10% chance of losing $100 is consid-
ered more serious than an actual loss of $10 in increased litigation 
costs, the economies achieved by precluding retrial of issues previ-
ously determined are unlikely to be exceeded by the additional ex-
penditure incurred at the initial trial. Given diminishing returns to 
investment in litigation, the amount invested should be smaller, in 
proportion to the liability, as the liability increases. 
Polasky's suggestion that extending the scope of collateral estop-
pel may also induce appeals that might otherwise not be brought is 
particularly unfortunate. If an appeal serves a valuable function but 
is not economically justifiable until the liability crosses a certain 
threshold, then the aggregation of claims via collateral estoppel 
might lead to a more functional allocation of litigation resources 
even if it does add to the appellate caseload. In other words, an 
economy of scale for the litigant may be achieved. 
Although the abandonment of mutuality may lead to such econo-
mies and, therefore, to more litigation in a particular case, it is no 
A 11. See Greenebaum, supra note 6, at 10-12; Moore & Currier, supra note 1, at 309; cf. 
Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. International Harvester Co., 120 F.2d 82, 84 (3d Cir. 1941) (even 
though judgment was held res judicata against person who secretly defended the suit on behalf 
of the record defendant, the court stated that the secret defendant could not have benefited 
from a favorable verdict since "to allow the secret defendant to have the advantage of the rule 
would be 'to force a plaintiff to prosecute to the utmost suits which, for personal or pecuniary 
reasons, he wishes to let slide'") (quoting 39 COLUM. L. REv. 1251, 1252 (1939); von Moschzis-
ker, supra note 1, at 303 (arguing that the real reason for the mutuality rule is that a party may 
not wish to establish or defend his position to the utmost in a given suit). 
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more likely to result in an overall increase in litigation than collat-
eral estoppel in general. On the other hand, while overall econo-
mies of scale may be desirable, should an individual litigant be 
forced to bear the accompanying costs in the form of an unfair share 
of the litigation risks? 
Fourth, it is said that the abandonment of mutuality inequitably 
burdens the common party's litigation resources and prevents him 
from allocating those resources rationally and efficiently. This criti-
cism has two elements: (1) that, absent mutuality, the common party 
cannot know how much to invest in any one trial because he does 
not know whether there will be future litigation; and (2) that the 
common party is disadvantaged by the lack of mutuality because the 
possibility of multiple litigation and the fear that one loss will pre-
clude him in all subsequent suits prevent a rational, effective alloca-
tion of litigation resources among the multiple trials.A12 
Greenebaum, for example, criticized the result in Zdanok v. Glidden 
Co. ,A13 in which the defendant was held to a prior judgment adjudi-
cating five claims in a subsequent suit involving 160 claims. Al-
though the court had dismissed the unfairness argument because the 
defendant common party knew at the time of the first trial of the 
existence of the claims, Greenebaum felt it "unfair to require a party 
to litigate as though 165 claims are at stake when he has the opportu-
nity to win with respect to only five."A14 
The first element of the criticism is not peculiar to multiparty 
cases. The unf oreseeability or uncertainty of future claims when the 
issue is first litigated is the fundamental constraint on the availability 
of collateral estoppel generally. When the extent of future liability 
was not reasonably foreseeable at the time of the initial suit and the 
liability in the subsequent suit turns out to be substantially dispro-
portionate to the claim actually decided, preclusive effect is charac-
teristically denied to the prior judgment.Ats 
The second element misperceives the problem. Greenebaum 
seems to be suggesting that the common party must invest in each 
trial as though all outstanding claims are at stake and that this has 
two possible consequences: either the resources he allocates to a 
given trial will be inadequate for the risk that he bears, or, if he 
expends the funds necessary to mount a proper effort and is forced to 
do so several times until he finally loses and is precluded, he will 
have spent far more than would be necessary under mutuality. 
The full and fair opportunity doctrine is essentially designed to 
remedy any severe misallocations of litigation resources that result 
Al2. See Greenebaum, supra note 6, at 2-3. 
A13. 327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964). 
A14. Greenebaum, supra note 6, at 15. 
AIS. See note 1 supra. 
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from collateral estoppel. Greenebaum suggests that the lack of mu-
tuality ipso facto results in resource misallocations sufficient to in-
voke the full and fair opportunity doctrine. In other words, he 
claims that the full and fair opportunity requirement, the only con-
straint supposedly remaining when mutuality is abandoned, cannot, 
because of the litigation burden imposed, be met when mutuality is 
abandoned. 
But the notion that resource misallocation lies at the heart of the 
case against Bernhard is simply wrong. The common party can al-
locate his resources rationally and can enjoy a full and fair opportu-
nity to litigate in each trial. It might seem that the optimal strategy 
is to litigate each case as though all outstanding claims were at stake. 
But if there are many claims, it is unlikely that the common party 
will reach the last case undefeated unless the probability of success 
in a given suit is extremely high. Alternatively, it might seem sensi-
ble to concentrate heavily on the early suits, so that at least they are 
not lost. But, in fact, the common party's actual total risk at each 
stage is not too much greater than the risk involved in a single claim, 
and he should spend accordingly. 
If, for example, there are five claims, each worth $200, and the 
probability of success in a single suit is .5, the expected loss under 
Bernhard is $806.25. (If the common party is a plaintiff this repre-
sents the amount he can expect not to recover. His expected recov-
ery is therefore $193.75.) He calculates his risks in an individual 
trial in the following manner. 
If he reaches the fifth case without having suffered a loss, his risk 
is $200 and his expected average loss is therefore $100. At the in-
ception of the fourth suit there are two possibilities: he can lose, at a 
cost of $400, or win and expect to lose $100 thereafter. Of course, he 
cannot actually lose $ 100 since the only possible outcomes in the 
fifth suit are O or $200, but $100 is the value of the loss to him while 
it remains contingent. As he commences the fourth suit he therefore 
has $300 at risk. That is the amount he can expect to save by de-
fending successfully. At the inception of the third suit he can lose, 
at a cost of $600, or win and expect to lose $250 thereafter. The 
amount at risk is thus only $350, since he expects to lose $250 in any 
event. 
Carrying the process through yields the results tabulated below. 
(Note that the $1612.50 multiplied by the .5 probability ofloss yields 
the expected loss. One way to think about the impact of Bernhard 
in this case is to suppose that it increases the amount at stake for the 
common party.) Finally, in oi:der to determine the truly optimal 
strategy the common party must take into account the costs that will 
be avoided if he loses prior to the last suit and is estopped to litigate 
further. 
















For illustrative purposes, the following table should prove help-
ful. 
$ % $ % 
IO 5 60 40 
20 14 70 44 
30 22 80 47 
40 29 90 49 
50 35 100 50 
TABLE G 
The first and third columns represent trial expenditure, the other col-
umns a hypothetical probability of success for each expenditure. 
Each successive $10 investment buys a smaller increment in the 
chances of success. 
In this hypothetical situation, a suit for $1000 justifies an expen-
diture of $100. The last $10 purchases a 1% increment in the 
probability with a value of $1000 x .01 = $10. A $200 claim justi-
fies an expenditure of $60. Thus, if five $200 claims are tried sepa-
rately under mutuality, the litigant's optimal expenditure is $300, 
and his expected loss is $600 (he has a .4 probability of success), a 
total expected loss of $900. 
Under Bernhard, if the cases are tried separately the optimal ex-
penditure at each point can be calculated as before, by starting with 
the last suit and performing an iterative computation. In the last 
suit the risk is $200, and the optimal expenditure is therefore $60. 
The expected loss is $120 which, added to the cost of the trial, yields 
a total expected loss of $180. At the outset of the fourth suit there 
are two possibilities: a loss at a cost of $400 or a win with an ex-
pected loss thereafter of $180. The amount at risk is therefore $220, 
and the optimal expenditure is still $60. The entire calculation is 
tabulated below. 
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Trial Amount at Trial p 
No. Risk Cost (ofloss) 
1 $232 $60 .6 
2 231 60 .6 
3 229 60 .6 
4 220 60 .6 
5 200 60 .6 
$11l2 $300 
TABLE H 
The amounts do not greatly exceed $200 because a loss avoids addi-
tional trial expenses and because the later claims are highly contin-
gent. The expected average-loss is $1112 X .6 = $667, and when it is 
added to the trial costs-the costs of five full trials must be added 
because the trial costs avoided are already figured into the amounts 
at risk-the total expected cost to the common party is $967, $67 
more than under mutuality. 
Damages Cumulative 
Loss on Paid trial costs 
Suit No. p (D) (C) PxD PxC Total 
1 .600 $1000 $ 60 $600 $36 $636 
2 .240 800 120 192 29 221 
3 .096 600 180 58 17 75 
4 .Q38 400 240 15 9 . 24 
5 .015 200 300 3 5 8 
No loss .010 -0- 300 -0- 3 3 
.999 $868 $99 $967 
TABLE J 
This example demonstrates that a rational resource allocation is 
possible without mutuality. The common party need not at any 
stage spend amounts disproportionate to the then-current risk. 
This is not to say, however, that the common party is not severely 
disadvantaged by the lack of mutuality. Even when the trial model 
is complicated by taking costs into account, the party facing multiple 
adversaries without benefit of mutuality still lives in the worst of all 
possible worlds. He can expect to pay $868 in damages, $268 more 
than under mutuality, a sum only partially offset by expected sayings 
in trial costs. (The small relative magnitude of the $67 increment in 
overall costs is not significant because the figure can be varied arbi-
trarily by making suitable choices for the relative magnitudes of the 
damages and the trial costs and by suitably varying the relationship 
between trial expenditure and probability of success.) 
To the extent that there are any resource misallocations uniquely 
attributable to the abandonment of mutuality rather than to collat-
eral estoppel in general, they burden not the common party but the 
noncommon party who is the first to litigate. Ignoring trial costs 
for the moment, it will be recalled that the common party had 
$387.50 at stake in the first trial of the five. But·the noncommon 
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party has only $200 at stake. The difference, $187.50, is the effective 
risk of the other noncommon parties who are not present. The 
noncommon party will invest in the trial an amount commensurate 
with his risk but will be outspent by the common party who has 
more at stake. The consequent imbalance disadvantages the first 
litigant in one of two ways: he must either spend somewhat more 
than he would were only his claim involved if he is to compensate 
for the additional expenditure by the common party, or he must face 
diminished chances of success due to the imbalance in litigation ex-
penditures. 
What is unfair to the common party about the lack of mutuality 
is the distribution of risks. When Greenebaum says, "It is unfair to 
require a party to litigate as though 165 claims are at stake when he 
has the opportunity to win with respect to only five," he is close to 
the mark. But he errs in placing the emphasis on the litigation bur-
den rather than on the risk of loss. 
If the common party is induced to spend more at trial it is only 
because he suffers greater risks without the mutuality requirement. 
To tum Greenebaum's argument around, the fact that a procedural 
change induces a litigant to increase his trial expenditure ought to 
suggest that the change has subjected him to new risks. To argue 
that he is unfairly burdened by the additional costs is akin to arguing 
that battery ought to be outlawed only because it unfairly burdens 
the victim with additional medical expenses. Litigation expenses, 
like medical costs, are part of the cure, not part of the disease. They 
are the litigant's means of minimizing the risk of loss to which he is 
otherwise subjected. Assuming he is receiving fair value· for his liti-
gation dollar, the additional expenses are to his advantage or his dol-
lar would remain in his pocket. If the additional expenses are 
objectionable, it is only because the risks that precipitate those ex-
penses are objectionable. The ~ase against Bernhard is most impor-
tantly that the common party is forced to bear more than his fair 
share of risk. 
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.APPENDIX B 
.Derivation of Table IV 
689 
Once its underlying assumptions and analytic framework are un-
derstood, the method of calculating the risk distribution in Table IV 
is easily followed. Any single "outcome,"B1 and hence the identity 
of the party ultimately bearing the loss, is determined by the verdicts 
in at most three suits: plaintiff against the primary defendant (P v . 
.D); plaintiff against the derivative defendant (!' v. S); and the deriv-
ative defendant against the primary defendant for indemnification 
(S v . .D). The probability of any outcome can be calculated merely 
by multiplying the probabilities of the component verdicts. For ex-
ample, assuming that each party has a 50% case, the probability of 
the plaintiff losing his suit against the primary defendant and win-
ning against the derivative defendant who recovers against the pri-
mary defendant in an indemnity action is p(!'I.D andPwS andSw.D) 
= p(PI.D) • p(PwS) • p(Sw.D) = .5 X .5 X .5 = .125. 
Although combinatorial analysis suggests that two possible ver-
dicts for each of three suits produces eight possible outcomes, not all 
the outcomes are distinguishable for practical purposes. Where .D is 
sued first, the outcomes Pw.D • PIS • Sw.D and Pw.D • PIS • SI.D 
are equivalent to Pw.D • PIS, since S will have no liability for which 
to seek indemnity. Similarly, PI.D • PIS • Sw.D and Pl.D • PIS • 
SI.D reduces to Pl.D • PIS. Consequently, the eight theoretical out-
comes are reduced to six practical ones. Equivalent reductions oc-
cur when S is sued first. 
The six initial outcomes are reduced further by rules of preclu-
sion, subrogation, and impleader. Consider the six possible out-
comes where .D is sued first. 
Pv . .D Pv.S Sv . .D 
1 w w w 
2 w w I 
3 w I 
4 I w w 
5 I w I 
6 I I 
FIGURE 2 
Under an exception to mutuality, outcomes 4, 5, and 6 constitute the 
single outcome Pl.D in which P bears the loss, since the loss to .D 
precludes further litigation. If S is allowed to subrogate an indem-
Bl. "Outcome" is defmed in note 143 supra. 
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nity claim to a verdict for P against .D ,B2 then outcomes 1, 2, and 3 
constitute the single outcome Pw.D and .D bears the loss. .D will ulti-
mately bear liability because either P will lose a subsequent suit 
against S or S will be automatically indemnified following a loss to 
P. 
Similarly, the number of possible outcomes would be reduced if 
S were allowed to implead.D,B3 or to vouch in .D when he is subse-
quently sued by P, irrespective of whether .D won his case.B4 Out-
comes 1 and 2 would equalPw.D • PwS and outcomes 4 and 5 would 
equal Pl.D • PwS. Stated another way, outcomes 1, 2, 4, and 5 
would constitute the outcome of a verdict for P against .D, with .D 
bearing the loss. 
Finally, consider the result when S is precluded from initiating 
an indemnity action against .D if .D has previously prevailed against 
P.Bs This rule would reduce outcomes 4 and 5 to the single outcome 
Pl.D • PwS, with S bearing the loss. 
Associated with each outcome is a party who ultimately bears the 
loss. And corresponding to any set of rules of preclusion, subroga-
tion, and impleader are a set of outcome probabilities. By combin-
ing the probabilities for outcomes that result in the same party 
bearing the loss, a risk distribution can be determined for each set of 
rules. Assume, for example, that there is no preclusion, no subroga-
tion of S to P 's judgment, and no impleader. Then compare the 
Probability 
of Risk of 
Pv.D Pv.S Sv. D outcome Loser loss 
w w w .125 D P = .2S 
w w I .12S I* D = .12S 
w I .25 D .2S 
PID does not ±...,ill 
preclude .s 
indemnity I w w .125 D s = .12s 
I w I .125 s I* = .12S 
I I .25 p 
w w w .12S D P = .25 
w w I .125 I* 
D = .12S 
PID does preclude +.25 
indemnity w I .25 D 775 
I w .25 s S = .25 
I I .25 p 1• = ,125 
* I represents the indeterminate outcome where either D or S is to bear the loss at P's discre-
tion. This Chart assumes there is no preclusion, no subrogation, and no impleader. 
TABLEK 
B2. See REsTATE.MENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 95, Comment a (Tent. Draft No. 3, 
1976). But see REsTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 107 (1942). 
B3. See FED. R. CIV. P. 14. 
B4. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS§ 107 (1942). 
BS. But see REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS§ 99, Comment b (Tent. Draft No. 
3, 1976). 
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distribution produced when S can seek indemnity from .D even 
though .D has successfully defended an action by P with the distribu-
tion produced when he cannot. These alternative sets of rules pro-
duce the following outcome probabilities and risk distributions. 
The difference between the two risk distributions is accounted for 
by the shift of .125 from .D's risk to S's. This shift results from the 
fact that the outcome Pl.D • PwS • Sw.D has been eliminated by the 
rule that PIJJ precludes a suit for indemnity. Thus, whenever the 
verdict PwS follows Pl.D, S bears the loss. 
The technique illustrated in these two examples was applied to 
all possible combinations for the rules discussed above to generate 
Table L. The risk distributions presented in Table IV are simply 
those calculated in Table L. 
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Primary Defendant Sued First 
No Preclusion Preclusion 
>, <> ?;,9 3§ c:= 
~ffl ~ ½ ~ .<> ... 
.g 
~ t,:i ~ 
jg 
o,- ... "4 g " -.<>::, ::iS::, .<>::, .. -.; -.; -.; 0 0 l;l > -.; > 0 0 u ...... -~=a ~8 ... ... ,g ll... ~ t,:i P.,O .9 ~ ll... ½ P..O 
No 
w w w .125 D w w w .125 D 
)II w I .125 I P= .25 w w I .125 I 
II) Subrogation I .25 D JJ= .375 
A 
I .25 D "Cl w w ::s toFs I w .25 s S= .25 I .5 p 'u >, 
II) -




Subrogation w .5 .D P= .25 w .s J) 
~ I w .25 s D= .5 B I .5 p 




i - w .125 D .125 J) 0 w w w w w z No w w I .125 I P= .25 w w I .125 I 
II) Subrogation w I .25 J) JJ= .5 w I .25 J) "Cl ::s toFs I w w .125 ]) S= .125 C I .5 p 'u 
~ Judgment I w I .125 s I= .125 
c:i..E;> I I .25 p 




w .5 D w .5 J) 
Q I w w .125 J) P= .25 I .s p 
~ toFs I w I .125 s D= .625 D 
~ Judgment I I .25 p S= .125 
No w w .25 J) w w .25 ]) 
II) 
Subrogation w I .25 J) P= .25 E w I .25 ]) "1::1 




Q .s Subrogation w .5 J) w .5 J) 
~ toFs I w .25 J)* P= .25 E I .5 p ... ~ Judgment I I .25 -P D·= .75 II) .., 
ol 
'a. II) 
.E .., No w w .25 ]) w w '.25 D ::s Subrogation I .25 J) P= .25 I .25 'u w w D 
~ to P's I w .25 ]) D= .75 E I .5 p g,. E;> 
Judgment I I .25 p o·i z II) 
8-g 
Subrogation .w .5 ]) .5 D o- w 
~ 
to P's I w .25 ]) P= .25 E I .5 p 
~ 
Judgment I I .25 p JJ= .75 
TABLE L 
* impleader negates the rule that PID precludes indemnity 
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Primary Defendant 
Sued First (concluded) 
Preclusion 
(concluded) 
d > .g - c:: ½ 
,>( g ., a :0 = > ·C =; ~8 Q,,, 
P= .5 )II 
D= .375 w 
I= .125 J )II 
I 
I 
P= .5 )II 
D= .5 K )II 
I 
I 
P= .5 )II 
D= .375 J )II 




P= .5 w 




P= .5 w 
D= .5 k I 
I 
P= .5 w 
.D= .5 K I 
I 
P= .5 w 
D= .5 K I 
I 
P= .5 w 
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Derivative Defendant Sued First 
No Preclusion ' 
>," ;-;:::a = > :a ~ 0 .,J -;; a '"= .. ½ ~ .c 0 " :g.a > > g._ ' ·i:: =a c..o .9 E-- 8 ·Q,,, Q,,, 
.125 D w w 
.125 I P= .25 w w 
.25 s D= .375 A w I 
.25 D S= .25 I 
.25 p I= .125 
.25 D w )II 
.25 s P= .25 B w I 
.25 p D-= .5 I 
.25 p S= .25 
.125 p w w 
.125 I P= .25 w w 
.125 D P= .5 w I 
.125 s S= .125 C w I 
.25 p I= .125 I 
.25 p 
.25 D w )II 
.125 D P= .25 w I 
.125 s D= .625 D w I 
.25 .D S= .125 I 
.25 p 
.5 D w 
.25 D P= .25 E I 
.25 p D= .15· 
.5 D w 
.25 p P= .25 E I 
.25 p D= .75 
.5 D w 
.25 p P= .25 E I 
.25 p .D= .75 
.5 D w 
.25 D P= .25 E I 
.25 p D= .75 
TABLE L ( concluded) 
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Preclusion 
>," I :38 = i::;d ~ 0 :c ~ .,J > '" = .. .!! a .c 0 ] .c = g._ ·C =; ,~8 t.:i c..o 
)II .125 D P= .5 
I .125 I D= .125 
.25 s S= .25 F 
.5 p I= .125 
.25 D P= .5 
.25 s D=.25 G 
.5 p S= .25 
w .125 D 
I .125 I P= .5 
)II .125 D D= .25 
I .125 s S= .125 H 
.5 p 'I= .125 
.25 D 
w .125 D P= .5 
I .125 s .D= .375 I 
.5 p S= .125 
.5 D P= .5 
.5 p D= .5 K 
.5 .D P= .5 
.5 p D= .5 K 
.5 D P= .5 
.5 p D= .5 J 
.5 .D ,P= .5 
.5 p D= .5 K 
